Executive summary
apache/pouchdb is rated At risk because critical security findings are open, most of them in the packages it uses. Its score is held back in part because we found no recorded design decisions and no architecture document or diagram. It scores 57 out of 100, which the At risk rating leaves unchanged.
Maturity, at 48, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is fixing the part of the code only one person knows, worth about 7 points. Recording design decisions comes next, worth about 6 points. Raising Maturity to 70 would lift the score to about 63.
Forty-one known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers. Fourteen pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with, and one automatic update takes new releases before a bad one can be spotted. Updating the vulnerable packages, pinning each tool to an exact version and setting a waiting period for automatic updates would close these risks. The three tests that check nothing need to check the result they produce.
The product code is 142 lines, too few for a meaningful rebuild estimate.
If Maturity rose from 48 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 57 to about 63.
New since the last survey: 67 findings
- Test Quality · Skipped test: Test basic view collation tests/mapreduce/test.views.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: destroy using prototype tests/mapreduce/test.views.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: Live changes should clean listener when cancelled tests/integration/test.changes.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: Descending many changes tests/integration/test.changes.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: Changes reports errors tests/integration/test.changes.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: Compaction removes non-leaf revs pt 4 (#2807) tests/integration/test.compaction.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: Testing get with some open_revs tests/integration/test.get.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: Testing get with open_revs on nonexistent doc tests/integration/test.get.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: These fail due to COUCHDB-3239 and COUCHDB-3240 tests/integration/test.get.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: pull replication with many changes + a conflict (#2543) tests/integration/test.replication.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: Empty replication updates checkpoint (#5145) tests/integration/test.replication.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: Syncing should stop if one replication fails (issue 838) tests/integration/test.replication.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: Test immediate replication canceling tests/integration/test.replication.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: Test sync cancel tests/integration/test.sync.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: Test sync cancel called twice tests/integration/test.sync.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: 3894 re-sync after immediate cancel tests/integration/test.sync.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: (unnamed test) tests/find/test-suite-2/test.kitchen-sink.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: special kitchen sink test #s001 tests/find/test-suite-2/test.kitchen-sink.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: returns false if field isn't in doc tests/find/test-suite-1/test.array.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: should find existing indexes tests/find/test-suite-1/test.basic.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: should create ddocs automatically tests/find/test-suite-1/test.basic.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: should create ddocs automatically 2 tests/find/test-suite-1/test.basic.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: should create ddocs automatically 3 tests/find/test-suite-1/test.basic.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: deletes indexes, callback style tests/find/test-suite-1/test.basic.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: deletes indexes, no type tests/find/test-suite-1/test.basic.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: should find existing indexes tests/find/test-suite-1/test.callbacks.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: Orders different data types correctly, including objects tests/find/test-suite-1/test.data-type-order.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: Orders min numbers correctly tests/find/test-suite-1/test.data-type-order.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: should create an index tests/find/test-suite-1/test.ddoc.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: should create an index, existing ddoc tests/find/test-suite-1/test.ddoc.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: should create an index, reused ddoc tests/find/test-suite-1/test.ddoc.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: sorts ok if _id used tests/find/test-suite-1/test.default-index.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: ne query will work and sort tests/find/test-suite-1/test.default-index.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: $and empty selector returns empty docs tests/find/test-suite-1/test.default-index.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: empty selector returns empty docs tests/find/test-suite-1/test.default-index.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: error - no usable index tests/find/test-suite-1/test.default-index.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: does eq queries, no index name tests/find/test-suite-1/test.eq.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: error: conflicting sort and selector tests/find/test-suite-1/test.errors.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: explains which index it uses tests/find/test-suite-1/test.explain.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: sorts correctly - complex tests/find/test-suite-1/test.sorting.js
- Test Quality · Skipped test: use index based on ddoc tests/find/test-suite-1/test.use-index.js
- Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: level-codec REDACTED
- Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: leveldown REDACTED
- Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: levelup REDACTED
- Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: memdown REDACTED
- Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: uuid REDACTED
- Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: eslint REDACTED
- Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: glob REDACTED
- Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: istanbul REDACTED
- Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: rimraf REDACTED
- Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: rollup-plugin-node-resolve REDACTED
- Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: rollup-plugin-replace REDACTED
- Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: stream-to-promise REDACTED
- Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated: ua-parser-js REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED
Fixed since the last survey: 13 findings
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
- Supply-chain Provenance & Signing REDACTED
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Performance
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 66 | High / Critical |
| A05:2025 — Injection | 21 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, address the single off-boarding risk in the Bus Factor and document key architectural decisions in a dedicated folder to preserve institutional knowledge. Next, integrate static security analysis into the continuous integration pipeline to prevent security regressions from being merged. Finally, resolve the thirteen deprecated dependencies and add assertions to the 214 tests currently lacking them to ensure code reliability and maintainability.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. | +6.8 pts | Low | Bus Factor |
| Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them. | +6.3 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Resolve the 3 No assertions (empty test) finding(s) in Test Quality — start with test.once.js (2), test.issue8581.js. | +2.5 pts | Low | Test Quality |
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/javascript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +4.9 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Resolve the 13 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (13). | +3.9 pts | Medium | Dependency Hygiene |
| Resolve the 4 Outdated (npm) finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (4). | +1.2 pts | Low | Dependency Hygiene |
| Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it. | +2.0 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite. | +1.7 pts | Medium | Documentation (README) |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 0.0 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 0.0 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 0.3 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 3.7 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| tests/integration/test.changes.js | 7.0 | Mixed | Test Quality: Skipped test: Live changes should clean listener when cancelled |
| tests/integration/test.compaction.js | 7.0 | Mixed | Test Quality: Skipped test: Compaction removes non-leaf revs pt 4 (#2807) |
| tests/integration/test.replication.js | 7.0 | Mixed | Test Quality: Skipped test: pull replication with many changes + a conflict (#2543) |
| tests/find/test-suite-1/test.basic.js | 7.0 | Mixed | Test Quality: Skipped test: should find existing indexes |
| tests/unit/test.once.js | 7.0 | Mixed | Test Quality: No assertions (empty test): Only call once ... once |
| tests/integration/test.attachments.js | 7.0 | Mixed | Test Quality: No assertions: 5736 warning for putAttachment without content_type |
| tests/integration/test.basics.js | 7.0 | Mixed | Test Quality: No assertions: 4314 Create a pouch with + in name |
| tests/integration/test.bulk_docs.js | 7.0 | Mixed | Test Quality: No assertions: No _rev and new_edits=false |
| tests/mapreduce/test.views.js | 7.0 | Mixed | Test Quality: Skipped test: Test basic view collation |
| tests/find/test-suite-1/test.errors.js | 7.0 | Mixed | Test Quality: Skipped test: error: conflicting sort and selector |
| tests/integration/test.close.js | 7.0 | Mixed | Test Quality: No assertions: should emit destroyed even when closed (sync) |
| tests/memleak/test.memleak.js | 7.0 | Mixed | Test Quality: No assertions: Test absence of memory leak in empty |
| tests/integration/test.get.js | 7.1 | Mixed | Test Quality: Skipped test: Testing get with some open_revs |
| tests/find/test-suite-1/test.default-index.js | 7.1 | Mixed | Test Quality: Skipped test: sorts ok if _id used |
| tests/find/test-suite-1/test.ddoc.js | 7.1 | Mixed | Test Quality: Skipped test: should create an index |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 48 of 48 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); none rely on LLM judgement. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 48 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 436 of 448 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Watchdog duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | — | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.js) and the coverage collector does support this ecosystem — it drives jest, vitest and mocha — but the only runner it declares is `mocha`, which the collector drives through `npm test` under a coverage provider — and that cannot reach a test script which delegates to a shell script or a build tool. Read from the manifests: the root package has a `scripts.test` of `./bin/run-test.sh` and declares `mocha`, which that command never names. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's runner coverage, not a missing .js runner and not a defect in this repository. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures. You can widen what we reach: optional: produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures — a committed report is read whatever runner produced it.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.js) and the reliability runner does support this ecosystem — it drives jest, vitest, mocha and egg-bin — but the only runner it declares is `mocha`, which the re-runner drives as `npm test -- --reporter json` — and that command cannot reach a test script which delegates to a shell script or a build tool. Read from the manifests: the root package has a `scripts.test` of `./bin/run-test.sh` and declares `mocha`, which that command never names. So flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's runner coverage, not a missing .js runner and not a finding about this repository.
- D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each ecosystem's manifests (what makes a folder runnable or a published package) need their own proof before D19 judges its units. Until then those folders' READMEs are judged only as documents (boilerplate, structure), never counted as complete.
- D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This kind did not reach the 95 % precision gate in three adjudicated runs (docs/plans/deterministic-engine/adjudication/D19-sample3-v3.md), so by the pre-registered fallback it publishes no row until a re-measurement shows it does. The candidates are counted here, not reported as findings, and the score does not include them.
- D20 ADR Quality — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. The ADR expectation is gated on whether a repository ships a deployable product. Our repo-kind classifier reads .NET project files and the host and package markers of the other ecosystems it knows (a Go `package main`, a Cargo binary, a REDACTED `bin`, `start` script or application dev server such as Vite or Next, Python console scripts or a Django/WSGI entry point, a Spring Boot / WAR / Gradle application build, a Rack or Rails app, a Composer project, an OTP release or escript, a Dockerfile, a Procfile, a Platform.sh `.platform/routes.yaml`, and the corresponding published-package manifests, including an OTP `*.app.src`, a Drupal module's `*.info` and a Claude Code `.claude-plugin/plugin.json`), and found none here, so we could not tell what kind of repository this is and did not assess its ADR log. This is a gap in our analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D21's deterministic naming rules are gated on C# first (docs/plans/deterministic-engine.md, P5): each other language is switched on only after its own concept suite and A/B gate pass. Until then its declarations carry no naming verdict this run — this says nothing about whether its names are consistent.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is an ADMISSION gap, not an environment fault: no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here. D22 DOES collect the public API of every language in this tree, and admits a project only when its manifest makes that ecosystem's publication act in a form the marker recognises — so what is missing is not a collector but an admission rule for the publication act this repository makes, if it makes one. The remedy is a better discriminator for that marker — not a collector, and no change to the scan image can close it. The marker's rules are measured to refuse applications, so one refused repository is the rule working as calibrated; several are the evidence that it is too strict. For npm the surface is what a published REDACTED's entry points (exports, main, module, types) export, followed through the source; an entry that names build output the tree does not commit (dist/, build/) is not followed back to source, because only a tsconfig outDir/rootDir pair states that mapping and a bundler's input lives in executable configuration this engine does not evaluate.
- D27 Navigability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Navigability is taken over call sites whose callee resolved. For C# that population includes calls into referenced assemblies; for this language only calls declared inside the repository count, so the abstention threshold reads the repository's use of its standard library as a resolution failure. That is a limit of this analyzer, not a build problem in this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection registrations in C# and Spring beans in Java/Kotlin only, and no container it models, or knows cannot hold a captive, was found in this repository's source, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DevServer (dev). the dev server did not expose a crawlable HTTP endpoint in time — no runtime evidence.
- M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 checks only the claim kinds adjudicated at or above 95 % precision: links and versions (PREREGISTRATION version 9), and artefact counts an order of magnitude off. Paths, command arguments, installs, environment variables, settings, projects, packages, routes, cd targets, infrastructure products and removed modules are read but not checked, and none of them is reported or counted.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. 2 JavaScript/TypeScript file(s) were read for weak hashes and ciphers, key material fixed in the source, disabled certificate validation and obsolete TLS versions, and none was found. The server controls this dimension also scores were not assessed, so no score is given.
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Scala, Rust, Swift, Ruby, Dart, PHP, Python and Go source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Scala, Rust, Swift, Ruby, Dart, PHP, Python or Go was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Scala, PHP, Ruby, Python, Go, Rust and Dart source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Scala, PHP, Ruby, Python, Go, Rust or Dart was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Go, PHP, Dart, Kotlin, Ruby, Scala, Java, Python and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and no named async function in this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, nor any Go, PHP or Dart function or Kotlin suspend function, makes a request that can be cancelled (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch; net/http, net.Dial; amphp; Dio; Ktor, OkHttp), so there is nothing to judge, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Scala, Ruby and Python source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Scala, Ruby or Python was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X3 Exception handling — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and PHP, Java, Kotlin, Python, Ruby, Scala, Dart, Swift, Erlang, Go and JavaScript/TypeScript source only, and no C# was loaded and no PHP, Java, Kotlin, Python, Ruby, Scala, Dart, Swift, Erlang, Go, JavaScript or TypeScript was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's JavaScript/TypeScript, Python and PHP make no call through a named logger, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 1 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D9 · Test Distribution
1443 test methods: 676 unit, 767 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e. The JavaScript/TypeScript suite contributes 1443 `it`/`test` case(s) across 110 test file(s) declaring at least one; its tier split is read from package names and paths only.
D10 · Test Quality
44 skipped (3 with a documented reason), 217 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 1443 tests.
What to do
- Resolve the 214 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with test.basics.js (34), test.attachments.js (22), test.bulk_docs.js (11). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (214 warning-level).
- Resolve the 3 No assertions (empty test) finding(s) in Test Quality — start with test.once.js (2), test.issue8581.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
- Resolve the 41 Skipped test finding(s) in Test Quality — start with test.basic.js (6), test.default-index.js (5), test.replication.js (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (41 warning-level).
- Enforce Test Quality in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
10 outdated direct production npm dependency(ies) of 18 graded, 0 pinning defect(s), across 1 REDACTED (1 of them the product) and 1 committed lockfile(s). Development dependencies are deliberately not graded for currency: that grade is about what SHIPS. 13 direct dependency(ies) — production, development or optional — are marked DEPRECATED by their publisher (the registry's per-version mark, or the lockfile's copy of it when the registry could not be asked); deprecated transitive packages are listed but not charged. Whether any is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — the registry publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Whether any is UNUSED is not graded either: that is a source question, and the frontend dependency lens (R8) answers it in this same run. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from the manifest there.
What to do
- Resolve the 13 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (13). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 warning-level).
- Resolve the 13 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (13). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 4 Outdated (npm) finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene — start with REDACTED (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 recommendation-level).
- Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 18 shipped npm package(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from registry.npmjs.org over the 18 production dependency(ies) this repository's committed lockfile resolves, across 1 product REDACTED manifest(s). Its 41 `devDependencies` declaration(s) are excluded: a consumer installs none of them. ★ DEPTH: this is the DIRECT production set the lockfile resolves, NOT the transitive closure — only one of the four lock dialects this pass reads states a full graph, so a banned licence pulled in only by a dependency's OWN dependencies is outside this verdict, exactly as the JVM arm's declaration-site verdict is. ★ Each licence is the one the registry publishes for the package's CURRENT release rather than for the pinned version, which is the same caveat the Hex and RubyGems arms carry. This repository publishes itself under Apache-2.0, which is its own choice and is not judged here.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D16 · Bus Factor
1 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is eleventy.config.js. Counted over 1 of the 2 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D19 · Documentation Quality
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 30 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).
D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 1 build units (npm) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
21 finding(s): 0 critical, 15 high, 6 medium, 0 low. 12 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 7 file(s) — `docs/_includes/anchor.html`, `docs/_includes/edit_button.html` (line 1), `docs/_includes/guide.html`, `docs/_includes/img.html` (lines 1–5), `docs/_includes/nav_item.html` (line 1), … (+2 more) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 1 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.
What to do
- Resolve the 6 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) charged to Static Analysis (SAST) — the other 12 are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which charges them once. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 issue-level, 2 of them charged here).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
66 finding(s): 4 critical, 37 high, 19 medium, 6 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 36 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (32), REDACTED (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (36 issue-level).
- Resolve the 4 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked. Counted over 1 of the 2 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 0 platform declaration(s) and 18 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX10 · Code composition
What to do
- The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
- A test is skipped/ignored — coverage that looks present but never runs. Re-enable it or delete it so the green run means something. (×40) — tests/find/test-suite-1/test.array.js:584, tests/find/test-suite-1/test.basic.js:98, tests/find/test-suite-1/test.basic.js:153, …
What to do
- Clear the softer debt: re-enable or delete skipped tests, decide whether each empty function is a deliberate no-op (and say so in a comment), and replace blanket `eslint-disable` / `@ts-nocheck` with targeted, justified suppressions.
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
- No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure
- Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it all sits under tests/ alongside the root build files, so the conventional src/ boundary between the product and its tooling isn't drawn.
What to do
- Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
M4 · Documentation accuracy
- README.md links to `pouchdb.com`, but `pouchdb.com` does not exist. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every REDACTED, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — README.md:47
What to do
- Reconcile the README with reality: README.md links to `pouchdb.com`, but `pouchdb.com` does not exist.
P1 · CI/CD gates
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/javascript`, or eslint-plugin-security as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 13307 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner. — REDACTED:13
- `REDACTED` declares packages, and nothing in the repository keeps them current: no Dependabot or Renovate configuration that schedules updates, and no dependency-review gate on pull requests. A pinned dependency stays at the version it was added at until someone notices — including after an advisory is published against it. Add a `.github/dependabot.yml` with one `package-ecosystem` entry per ecosystem the tree uses (or an enabled `renovate.json`), and gate pull requests with `actions/dependency-review-action`. — REDACTED:40
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/javascript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
What to do
- Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
P6 · Release Hygiene
- The changelog this check read carries 0 versioned entries, against a bar of 3. Counted as either the distinct `x.y.z` versions it names (a link's target is not counted) or its version-shaped section headings (`## [1.2.0]`, `## V14.x.x`, `## Updates in 8.0.x`), whichever is the larger — so a log sectioned by minor series counts its sections, not its individual patch numbers. Entries recorded somewhere this check does not read — release notes generated at tag time from a generator config it did not recognise, or a log kept outside the repository — are not counted here, and this row is about what is re-findable in the tree rather than about how often you release.
What to do
- Keep the changelog current — add a versioned entry (Keep-a-Changelog ## [x.y.z]) for each release so the history isn't a stub.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene
X1 · Async correctness
X12 · Unreachable branch
X13 · Undrained process stream
X16 · Unfloored truncation loop
X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness
X19 · Unrestored process-global state
X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard
X22 · Contradicted release guard
X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation
X25 · Inert configuration knob
X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard
X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element
X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Architecture | 69% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
| Maturity | 48% | Weak — gated by D16, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 51% | Adequate — gated by P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 69% | Adequate — gated by D30 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Performance | 100% | Exemplary | Solid. |
Unscored — 2 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — 1 observation(s) recorded · The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release). Build integrity and workflow-token hygiene are reported below: they describe what the CI runs and the token it runs with, neither of which is affected by whether the pipeline ships an artifact.
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — 14 observation(s) recorded · Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
Not evidenced — 1 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 69 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — Frontend below the scale floor (22 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC2 Forms & labels — Frontend below the scale floor (22 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC3 Page structure — Frontend below the scale floor (22 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — Frontend below the scale floor (22 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — Frontend below the scale floor (22 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — Frontend below the scale floor (22 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — Frontend below the scale floor (22 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — Not applicable: TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — the dev server did not expose a crawlable HTTP endpoint in time — no runtime evidence This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no data at rest for these controls to protect. If it does persist personal data (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the controls belong to wherever that data is stored.
- C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — this repository stands up no server (no Express, Fastify, Koa, Hono, NestJS or similar app, no Next.js/SvelteKit/Nuxt server route, no edge function), creates no Supabase tables and talks to no hosted backend. Access control is therefore N/A here — a browser application or library is authorized by the server it calls, not by itself; a client-side route guard hides a page and authorizes nothing. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the limit belongs wherever that data is stored.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over. If it does (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the rights are served wherever that data is stored.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — the mocha suite is behind a delegating test script
- D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D20 ADR Quality — Repository kind not determined
- D21 Naming Consistency — Naming consistency is measured on C# only; JavaScript, html not measured.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ sibling projects each declaring an entity of their own or taking another project's integration events. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — No hand-written C# or Visual Basic source; comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D27 Navigability — D27 counts a call into the standard library or a dependency as unresolved for this repository's language (.html,.js), so too few call sites counted as resolved to assess navigability. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this npm build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — the mocha suite is behind a delegating test script
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- P2 Observability — This repository's JavaScript/TypeScript source (1 module(s), 2 file(s) read) declares no entry point and bootstraps no server, and nothing here deploys a service — it is a library, run inside whatever hosts it, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. If it grows a binary or a service, the dimension reactivates.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the JavaScript/TypeScript source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for tinybench, mitata, benchmark.js, benny or vitest `bench(...)` calls in files that import them (or `*.bench.*` files), or one of those in a REDACTED, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not applicable: TypeScript/JavaScript runs on a garbage-collected runtime that gives a program no allocation-control idiom to choose on a hot path — no pools, stack allocation or value types — so allocation awareness is not something this code can be rated on.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: 2 JavaScript/TypeScript file(s) were read for weak hashes and ciphers, key material fixed in the source, disabled TLS certificate validation and obsolete TLS versions, and none was found. That half of the dimension is clean, but it is not scored on its own: a C# repository with the same clean reading is scored on its server controls as well, or is N/A for having no web surface, and neither can be decided here. The server controls — HTTPS enforcement, HSTS, cookie flags, input validation — are NOT assessed for JavaScript/TypeScript: each is scored as an absence, an absence is only reportable over the production HTTP server, and in this ecosystem the file that opens the port is build output or a framework launcher rather than a file in the source tree. Their absence here is not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. TypeScript/JavaScript runs every callback on the one thread that owns its objects: a callback runs only when the body waiting on it has yielded, never alongside it, and a worker thread receives a COPY of what it is sent. A SharedArrayBuffer carries raw bytes, never an Array, Map or Set, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — Not applicable: this check looks for a loop whose body adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is walking, invalidating the enumerator it holds, and in this repository's languages that cannot happen. JavaScript and TypeScript have no iterator that a change can invalidate: an `Array` is walked by index against its live length, and a `Map` or `Set` by the ECMAScript specification's live entry list, so a body that adds to, removes from or empties what it walks raises nothing — every loop form (`for…of`, `for…in`, `forEach`, `map`, `filter`, `reduce`, `entries()`) on every built-in collection (`Array`, `Map`, `Set`, plain objects, `URLSearchParams`, `Headers`, `FormData`) runs to completion. Such a loop can still skip an element or never end, which is a different defect and not the one this check asks about. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — Not applicable: this check asks whether the null-typed discipline a language offers is switched on, and how much of that the assertion operator takes back, and in this repository's languages there is no such switch and no such operator. Plain JavaScript carries no type annotations and commits no tsconfig, so it states no null-typed discipline for this check to grade: there is nothing here that switches null checking on or off, and TypeScript (or `// @ts-check`) is how a repository acquires one — advice, not a defect this card measures. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 59 finding(s)
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- No assertions (empty test): Only call once ... once tests/unit/test.once.js:11
- No assertions (empty test): Once wrapped in a promise tests/unit/test.once.js:17
- No assertions (empty test): #8581 Should not raise error tests/integration/test.issue8581.js:26
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Serious — 308 finding(s)
- No assertions: Clones regular objects tests/unit/test.clone.js:10
- No assertions: Clones regular dates tests/unit/test.clone.js:34
- No assertions: Clones dates non finite dates tests/unit/test.clone.js:39
- No assertions: verify key normalizations tests/unit/test.collate.js:187
- No assertions: verify toIndexableString() tests/unit/test.collate.js:240
- No assertions: verify toIndexableString() tests/unit/test.collate.js:325
- No assertions: throws error in parseIndexableString on invalid input tests/unit/test.collate.js:460
- No assertions: callbackify should work with a callback tests/unit/test.mapreduce.js:71
- No assertions: Race condition initially discovered with PouchDB in-memory-adapter 7.3.0 tests/unit/test.memory-adapter.js:6
- No assertions: normalizes null to a non existing value tests/unit/test.utils.js:20
- No assertions: throws if it can't parse the function name tests/unit/test.utils.js:31
- No assertions: benchmarking tests/performance/utils.js:41
- No assertions: Test absence of memory leak in empty tests/memleak/test.memleak.js:299
- No assertions: Test absence of memory leak in reference code tests/memleak/test.memleak.js:312
- No assertions: Test limited memory leak in PouchDB core (using dummy) tests/memleak/test.memleak.js:342
- No assertions: Test limited memory leak in PouchDB core tests/memleak/test.memleak.js:358
- No assertions: Test limited memory leak in PouchDB core (many names) tests/memleak/test.memleak.js:374
- No assertions: Test basic memory leak in PouchDB http adapter tests/memleak/test.memleak.js:397
- No assertions: Test basic memory leak in PouchDB leveldown adapter tests/memleak/test.memleak.js:434
- No assertions: Query result should include _conflicts tests/mapreduce/test.mapreduce.js:1264
- No assertions: #2858 Query works with attachments=true, binary=true 2 tests/mapreduce/test.mapreduce.js:1435
- No assertions: Special document member _doc_id_rev should never leak outside tests/mapreduce/test.mapreduce.js:1940
- No assertions: If reduce function returns 0, resulting value should not be null tests/mapreduce/test.mapreduce.js:2015
- No assertions: should error with a callback tests/mapreduce/test.persisted.js:289
- No assertions: should delete duplicate indexes tests/mapreduce/test.persisted.js:385
- Skipped test: Test basic view collation tests/mapreduce/test.views.js:168
- Skipped test: destroy using prototype tests/mapreduce/test.views.js:669
- Skipped test: Live changes should clean listener when cancelled tests/integration/test.changes.js:102
- Skipped test: Descending many changes tests/integration/test.changes.js:804
- Skipped test: Changes reports errors tests/integration/test.changes.js:1869
- Skipped test: Compaction removes non-leaf revs pt 4 (#2807) tests/integration/test.compaction.js:386
- Skipped test: Testing get with some open_revs tests/integration/test.get.js:518
- Skipped test: Testing get with open_revs on nonexistent doc tests/integration/test.get.js:623
- Skipped test: These fail due to COUCHDB-3239 and COUCHDB-3240 tests/integration/test.get.js:1063
- Skipped test: pull replication with many changes + a conflict (#2543) tests/integration/test.replication.js:159
- Skipped test: Empty replication updates checkpoint (#5145) tests/integration/test.replication.js:1691
- Skipped test: Syncing should stop if one replication fails (issue 838) tests/integration/test.replication.js:2689
- Skipped test: Test immediate replication canceling tests/integration/test.replication.js:3444
- Skipped test: Test sync cancel tests/integration/test.sync.js:288
- Skipped test: Test sync cancel called twice tests/integration/test.sync.js:298
- Skipped test: 3894 re-sync after immediate cancel tests/integration/test.sync.js:333
- Skipped test: (unnamed test) tests/find/test-suite-2/test.kitchen-sink.js:108
- Skipped test: special kitchen sink test #s001 tests/find/test-suite-2/test.kitchen-sink.js:113
- Skipped test: returns false if field isn't in doc tests/find/test-suite-1/test.array.js:584
- Skipped test: should find existing indexes tests/find/test-suite-1/test.basic.js:98
- Skipped test: should create ddocs automatically tests/find/test-suite-1/test.basic.js:153
- Skipped test: should create ddocs automatically 2 tests/find/test-suite-1/test.basic.js:193
- Skipped test: should create ddocs automatically 3 tests/find/test-suite-1/test.basic.js:233
- Skipped test: deletes indexes, callback style tests/find/test-suite-1/test.basic.js:278
- Skipped test: deletes indexes, no type tests/find/test-suite-1/test.basic.js:342
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- Test failure does not fail the CI gate REDACTED:101
- Test failure does not fail the CI gate REDACTED:106
- Test failure does not fail the CI gate REDACTED:151
- Test failure does not fail the CI gate REDACTED:156
- Test failure does not fail the CI gate REDACTED:205
- Test failure does not fail the CI gate REDACTED:210
- Test failure does not fail the CI gate REDACTED:260
- Test failure does not fail the CI gate REDACTED:265
- Test failure does not fail the CI gate REDACTED:312
- Test failure does not fail the CI gate REDACTED:317
- Test failure does not fail the CI gate REDACTED:341
- Test failure does not fail the CI gate REDACTED:346
- Test failure does not fail the CI gate REDACTED:392
- Test failure does not fail the CI gate REDACTED:397
- Deprecated: level-codec REDACTED:46
- Deprecated: leveldown REDACTED:48
- Deprecated: levelup REDACTED:49
- Deprecated: memdown REDACTED:52
- Deprecated: uuid REDACTED:57
- Deprecated: eslint REDACTED:72
- Deprecated: glob REDACTED:76
- Deprecated: istanbul REDACTED:79
- Deprecated: rimraf REDACTED:90
- Deprecated: rollup-plugin-node-resolve REDACTED:92
- Deprecated: rollup-plugin-replace REDACTED:93
- Deprecated: stream-to-promise REDACTED:97
- Deprecated: ua-parser-js REDACTED:101
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Minor — 72 finding(s)
- Disabled test tests/find/test-suite-1/test.array.js:584
- Disabled test tests/find/test-suite-1/test.basic.js:98
- Disabled test tests/find/test-suite-1/test.basic.js:153
- Disabled test tests/find/test-suite-1/test.basic.js:193
- Disabled test tests/find/test-suite-1/test.basic.js:233
- Disabled test tests/find/test-suite-1/test.basic.js:278
- Disabled test tests/find/test-suite-1/test.basic.js:342
- Disabled test tests/find/test-suite-1/test.callbacks.js:37
- Disabled test tests/find/test-suite-1/test.data-type-order.js:59
- Disabled test tests/find/test-suite-1/test.data-type-order.js:119
- Disabled test tests/find/test-suite-1/test.ddoc.js:4
- Disabled test tests/find/test-suite-1/test.ddoc.js:54
- Disabled test tests/find/test-suite-1/test.ddoc.js:108
- Disabled test tests/find/test-suite-1/test.default-index.js:112
- Disabled test tests/find/test-suite-1/test.default-index.js:168
- Disabled test tests/find/test-suite-1/test.default-index.js:206
- Disabled test tests/find/test-suite-1/test.default-index.js:235
- Disabled test tests/find/test-suite-1/test.default-index.js:295
- Disabled test tests/find/test-suite-1/test.eq.js:105
- Disabled test tests/find/test-suite-1/test.errors.js:73
- Disabled test tests/find/test-suite-1/test.explain.js:30
- Disabled test tests/find/test-suite-1/test.sorting.js:96
- Disabled test tests/find/test-suite-1/test.use-index.js:44
- Disabled test tests/integration/browser.worker.js:12
- Disabled test tests/integration/test.changes.js:102
- Deprecated: uuid REDACTED:2675
- Deprecated: ecstatic REDACTED:3670
- Deprecated: uuid REDACTED:4569
- Deprecated: gar REDACTED:4986
- Deprecated: har-validator REDACTED:5287
- Deprecated: glob REDACTED:6313
- Deprecated: glob REDACTED:7443
- Deprecated: natives REDACTED:7757
- Deprecated: minimatch REDACTED:7884
- Deprecated: querystring REDACTED:10131
- Deprecated: request REDACTED:10484
- Deprecated: uuid REDACTED:10547
- Deprecated: stable REDACTED:11301
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- Outdated (npm): memdown REDACTED:52
- Outdated (npm): readable-stream REDACTED:54
- Outdated (npm): uuid REDACTED:57
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
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- No ADRs
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- No src/ separation
- README/code drift README.md:47
- No SAST REDACTED:13
- No dependency-update automation REDACTED:40
- Changelog looks stale/thin
Minor — 9 finding(s)
- Outdated (npm): execa
- Outdated (npm): fetch-cookie
- Outdated (npm): level-codec
- Outdated (npm): levelup
- Outdated (npm): node-fetch
- Outdated (npm): through2
- Skipped (documented): #8525 - Only compact document with seq > last_seq tests/integration/test.compaction.js:501
- Skipped (documented): target doesn't leak "destroyed" event listener tests/integration/test.retry.js:215
- Skipped (documented): 5007 sync 2 databases tests/integration/test.sync.js:757
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-610e2bebc0e14312892297e61a7dae2a/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-610e2bebc0e14312892297e61a7dae2a/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt --exclude docs/static/js . | 21 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 66 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |