Public report of mortdeus/solana-copy-sniper-mev-trading-bot, published 28 October 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of
findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known
vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive reportMeasured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.10.5). Assert signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey →
Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 28 October 2026, 12:52 UTC · Survey ID cd_f13ca2bc5985428ea317d1d769814ced
mortdeus/solana-copy-sniper-mev-trading-bot
Measured 28 October 2026, 12:52 UTC, at code version 5d92c31
No regression since the last survey
A regression is a drop of 0.5 points or more in the score, or of 2.5 or more out of 10 in a dimension, since the last survey.
CAI scoreAt riskDown 2 since the last survey
The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.
A small codebase: 6,879 lines of product code in 7 projects, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: under 0.1 person-years · Weakest lens: Production Readiness, 10
Findings by how serious they are
39 critical132 serious85 minor
18 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, Watchdog either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard it looks for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.
This survey was produced by
Watchdog
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Watchdog engine 1.0.0
Measured
28 October 2026, 12:52 UTC
A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number
together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee
the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds Watchdog. It is open to any tool that
implements it, and today Watchdog is the only one that does.
A critical security finding is open, such as a library with a known critical vulnerability or a password or key found in the code. The score itself is unchanged, but its band shows At risk until the finding is fixed. See the Security and Compliance lens.
The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. Watchdog works it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸
74of 74 dimensions measured by tools.
239of 256 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 17 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
74dimensions across 7 lenses, read from 6,879 lines of product code in 7 projects.
mortdeus/solana-copy-sniper-mev-trading-bot is rated At risk because critical security findings are open, most of them in the packages it uses. Its score is held back because we found no working pipeline that builds or tests changes to the code and no automated security scanning of the code, its secrets or its dependencies. It scores 29 out of 100, which the At risk rating leaves unchanged.
Production Readiness, at 10, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first step is adding text alternatives, worth about 3 points. Adding an automated build and test pipeline would lift Production Readiness itself, worth about 2 points. Raising Production Readiness to 70 would lift the score to about 45.
Twenty-seven known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers. Six passwords or keys are open to anyone who can read the repository. Updating the vulnerable packages and replacing each exposed password or key would close both risks. The four loops of files that import each other need breaking.
The product code is 6,879 lines, about €5,900 to rebuild.
A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.
How the score is built: what each lens counts forThe lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
Visual & motion safety · Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/index.html
Watchdog compares every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.
Fixed since the last survey: 2 findings
These 2 critical or serious findings were in the previous survey, on 14 October 2026, and are gone from this one.
Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
Rebuild cost: about €5,900 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild
€1,900 to €9,800, for 32 to 103 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problem
Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor
×0.7 at a score of 29. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
Size
Small: 6,879 lines of product code
What it is not
Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one.
How the estimate is made: Watchdog prices the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty. For this code, every line is priced as straight logic, which keeps the estimate on the low side.
Top priorities
The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.
1
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
Raises the score by about 3 points · Medium effort · Text alternatives
2
Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
Raises the score by about 2 points · Medium effort · Type Safety
3
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.
Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €5,900 to build again, under 0.1 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Production Readiness, at 10 (Critical). Production Readiness is about whether the product is ready to run in production and to change without breaking. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Production Readiness also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Production Readiness grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Production Readiness actions in Top priorities.
If you do one thing first · First action
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 3 points for medium effort. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort
Architecture — module dependency graph
Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways, which only happens where the projects form a dependency cycle. A graph without cycles has none.
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.
48 modules, with 18 dependencies between them. One loop runs through 2 of the modules, marked above the diagonal.
The table shows the 40 modules with the most connections; 8 more are left out to keep it readable.
Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
uses →
1 (global)
2 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC
3 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC
4 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC.dashboard
5 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC.dashboard.public
6 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC.dashboard.public.dashboard
7 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC.services.notifications
8 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC.services.riskManager
9 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC.utils
10 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket
grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.commands uses grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.db, so a change to grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.db can break grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.commands, while a change to grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.commands can't break grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.db.
Position
Below the diagonal: grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.commands uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
29→35 grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.engine.swap uses grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.utilspart of a loop✕
Connections
2 pairs of types, where a type in grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.engine.swap uses a type in grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.utils.
grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.engine.swap uses grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.utils, so a change to grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.utils can break grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.engine.swap, while a change to grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.engine.swap can't break grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.utils.
Position
Above the diagonal, so it is part of a loop. Neither module can be changed, tested or released on its own until one of these dependencies is removed.
grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.services.zeroslot uses grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.services.jito, so a change to grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.services.jito can break grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.services.zeroslot, while a change to grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.services.zeroslot can't break grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.services.jito.
Position
Below the diagonal: grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.services.zeroslot uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
1 pair of types, where a type in jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.client_error uses a type in jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.request.
jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.client_error uses jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.request, so a change to jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.request can break jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.client_error, while a change to jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.client_error can't break jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.request.
Position
Below the diagonal: jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.client_error uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
1 pair of types, where a type in jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client uses a type in jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.request.
jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client uses jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.request, so a change to jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.request can break jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client, while a change to jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client can't break jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.request.
Position
Below the diagonal: jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
1 pair of types, where a type in jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_sender uses a type in jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.request.
jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_sender uses jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.request, so a change to jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.request can break jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_sender, while a change to jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_sender can't break jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.request.
Position
Below the diagonal: jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_sender uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
1 pair of types, where a type in grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.rpc uses a type in jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client.
grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.rpc uses jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client, so a change to jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client can break grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.rpc, while a change to grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.rpc can't break jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client.
Position
Below the diagonal: grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.rpc uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.utils uses grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.engine.swap, so a change to grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.engine.swap can break grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.utils, while a change to grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.utils can't break grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.engine.swap.
Position
Below the diagonal: grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.utils uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
1 pair of types, where a type in grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.utils uses a type in jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client.
grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.utils uses jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client, so a change to jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client can break grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.utils, while a change to grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.utils can't break jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client.
Position
Below the diagonal: grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.utils uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
1 pair of types, where a type in grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.core.token uses a type in jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client.
grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.core.token uses jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client, so a change to jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client can break grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.core.token, while a change to grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.core.token can't break jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client.
Position
Below the diagonal: grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.core.token uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.core.tx uses grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.logger, so a change to grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.logger can break grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.core.tx, while a change to grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.core.tx can't break grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.logger.
Position
Below the diagonal: grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.core.tx uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.core.tx uses jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client, so a change to jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client can break grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.core.tx, while a change to grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.core.tx can't break jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client.
Position
Below the diagonal: grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.core.tx uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
1 pair of types, where a type in jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.http_sender uses a type in jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.request.
jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.http_sender uses jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.request, so a change to jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.request can break jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.http_sender, while a change to jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.http_sender can't break jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.request.
Position
Below the diagonal: jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.http_sender uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
1 pair of types, where a type in jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.http_sender uses a type in jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_sender.
jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.http_sender uses jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_sender, so a change to jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_sender can break jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.http_sender, while a change to jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.http_sender can't break jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_sender.
Position
Below the diagonal: jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.http_sender uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
1 pair of types, where a type in grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.dex.middleware uses a type in jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client.
grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.dex.middleware uses jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client, so a change to jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client can break grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.dex.middleware, while a change to grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.dex.middleware can't break jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client.
Position
Below the diagonal: grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.dex.middleware uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.dex.middleware uses grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.utils, so a change to grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.utils can break grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.dex.middleware, while a change to grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.dex.middleware can't break grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.utils.
Position
Below the diagonal: grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.dex.middleware uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
2 pairs of types, where a type in grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.dex.pump_fun uses a type in jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client.
grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.dex.pump_fun uses jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client, so a change to jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client can break grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.dex.pump_fun, while a change to grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.dex.pump_fun can't break jito_block_engine_json_rpc_client.jsonrpc_client.rpc_client.
Position
Below the diagonal: grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.dex.pump_fun uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.dex.pump_fun uses grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.utils, so a change to grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.utils can break grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.dex.pump_fun, while a change to grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.dex.pump_fun can't break grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.common.utils.
Position
Below the diagonal: grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust.dex.pump_fun uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health · 42% · Weak · gated by R1, X4 ·
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures
43
High / Critical
A07:2025 — Authentication Failures
7
High / Critical
A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration
1
Medium
A08:2025 — Software or Data Integrity Failures
1
Medium
Roadmap
First, ensure accessibility by adding text alternatives to media and fixing visual contrast and focus styles. Next, improve code reliability by adopting TypeScript for the frontend and establishing a CI/CD pipeline to run tests on every change. Finally, strengthen operational resilience by codifying disaster recovery and backup procedures in infrastructure as code.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Add a test runner (vitest / jest / playwright) and eslint and type checking (adopt TypeScript, or type-check the existing JavaScript with `checkJs`) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/shared_state/src/lib.rs
8.5
Near-clean
God Classes: TooManyMethods: BoughtTokenInfo
How the grades work
Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this
survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.
Critical — 39
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a
missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here
tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Serious — 132
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades
the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to
carry for two years either.
Minor — 85
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions.
Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Could not be resolved — 18
Something this survey could not settle
from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no
positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves
nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean
result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither
rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each
one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 74 of 74 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); none rely on LLM judgement. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 74 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 239 of 256 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.rs) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `cargo install cargo-llvm-cov`, then `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures. You can widen what we reach: optional: produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `cargo install cargo-llvm-cov`, then `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures — then the real number is read on the next scan.
D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.rs) and this repository declares a Cargo test suite (#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream, 3 test files), but it was not re-run: no test result was produced. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D12 Dependency Hygiene — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Not scored — 61 direct Cargo declaration(s) were read, but the outdated signal needs crates.io, and no committed Cargo.lock resolves them to versions, so this dimension's own question is only partly answered. NOT a finding that these dependencies are current or healthy.
D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares package.json, but the licence verdict published here was taken over its crate dependencies. Nothing was read about its npm dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — measured, with a gap in what it reached — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Git history depth insufficient — this repository has 16 commit(s), too few for a reliable trend signal. The clone is complete, so there is no deeper history to fetch: the signal returns as the project accumulates history.
D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Too few commits for a meaningful bus factor (16 commit(s) sampled, fewer than the 50 this dimension needs before a bus factor means anything).
D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each ecosystem's manifests (what makes a folder runnable or a published package) need their own proof before D19 judges its units. Until then those folders' READMEs are judged only as documents (boilerplate, structure), never counted as complete.
D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This kind did not reach the 95 % precision gate in three adjudicated runs (docs/plans/deterministic-engine/adjudication/D19-sample3-v3.md), so by the pre-registered fallback it publishes no row until a re-measurement shows it does. The candidates are counted here, not reported as findings, and the score does not include them.
D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D21's deterministic naming rules are gated on C# first (docs/plans/deterministic-engine.md, P5): each other language is switched on only after its own concept suite and A/B gate pass. Until then its declarations carry no naming verdict this run — this says nothing about whether its names are consistent.
D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22's deterministic call-shape rules are gated on C# first (docs/plans/deterministic-engine.md, P5): each other language is switched on only after its own concept suite and A/B gate pass. This says nothing about whether that surface is consistent.
D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover the language this repository's product is written in, so it had nothing of the product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
D27 Navigability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Navigability is taken over call sites whose callee resolved. For C# that population includes calls into referenced assemblies; for this language only calls declared inside the repository count, so the abstention threshold reads the repository's use of its standard library as a resolution failure. That is a limit of this analyzer, not a build problem in this repository.
D28 Secrets (history) — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. D28's config-credential rule (WD-SECRET-0002) parses each committed `.json` config as a document and reads credential-named values; `#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/logs.json` did not parse (JSON5, a template, several concatenated documents), so a credential bound there is UNMEASURED by that rule. gitleaks still scanned the same files as text.
D34 Knowledge Freshness — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Too few commits to judge knowledge freshness (16 commit(s) sampled).
D35 Change Coupling — measured, with a gap in what it reached — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Git history depth insufficient — this repository has 16 commit(s), too few for a reliable change-coupling signal. The clone is complete, so there is no deeper history to fetch: the signal returns as the project accumulates history.
D44 Platform End-of-Life — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This dimension reads a project's own statement about the platform it runs on: a TargetFramework in a .NET project file, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain file or Cargo.toml rust-version, a .go-version, .java-version, .ruby-version, .tool-versions or .sdkmanrc, a go.mod go directive, a Maven or Gradle Java level or toolchain, a Gemfile's ruby directive, a mix.exs elixir requirement, a rebar.config minimum_otp_vsn, a pubspec.yaml SDK constraint, a build.sbt scalaVersion, or a framework major pinned by a dependency constraint. This repository carries none of them, so nothing about its platform was established. That is a gap in this analyzer's coverage, NOT a finding that the platform is supported — a language whose runtime is declared elsewhere (Package.swift, a Dockerfile) is simply not read here yet.
AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DockerCompose (REDACTED). compose up failed (exit 17 — an image could not be built) — rustapp Pulling rustapp Warning pull access denied for francescoxx/rustapp, repository does not exist or may require 'docker login': denied: requested access to the resource is denied failed to solve: failed to read dockerfile: open Dockerfile: no such file or directory; runtime evidence skipped.
C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. 'mongodb' is imported (#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/commands.rs:4), but no entity, schema, table or model declaration this check reads was found beside it, so whether personal data is stored could not be decided.
C3 Audit Trail — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. 'mongodb' is imported (#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/commands.rs:4), but no entity, schema, table or model declaration this check reads was found beside it, so whether personal data is stored could not be decided.
C4 Data Retention — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. 'mongodb' is imported (#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/commands.rs:4), but no entity, schema, table or model declaration this check reads was found beside it, so whether personal data is stored could not be decided.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. 'mongodb' is imported (#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/commands.rs:4), but no entity, schema, table or model declaration this check reads was found beside it, so whether personal data is stored could not be decided.
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and this repository's Rust is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and this repository's Rust is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
M4 Documentation accuracy — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. M4 checks only the claim kinds adjudicated at or above 95 % precision: links and versions (PREREGISTRATION version 9), and artefact counts an order of magnitude off. Paths, command arguments, installs, environment variables, settings, projects, packages, routes, cd targets, infrastructure products and removed modules are read but not checked, and none of them is reported or counted.
P2 Observability — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. 39 further occurrence(s) are not listed individually; the score already reflects all 79.
X5 Nullable reference types — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax and MSBuild project configuration, TypeScript source and its tsconfig files, Java source and its package and module declarations, PHP source and its PHPStan and Psalm configuration, Dart source and its pubspec language version, Ruby source and its Sorbet and Steep configuration, Scala source and its build's explicit-nulls, WartRemover and Scalafix settings, and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded, no TypeScript was found, and this repository's Rust is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D13 REDACTED Scanning: REDACTED detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
21 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::commands::handle_command at 38. A further 1 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::token_serializable::convert_to_serializable at 25 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score. 1 file carries no cyclomatic complexity row at all for this reason — every one of its over-threshold functions was excluded, so the exclusion is disclosed nowhere in the file itself: #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/token_serializable.rs (grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::token_serializable::convert_to_serializable at 25). They are named here because the per-file figures other dimensions report are taken BEFORE this exclusion, so such a file can show a high maximum complexity elsewhere in this report and nothing here, with nothing to reconcile the two.
grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::commands::handle_command (cyclomatic 38) · ×3#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/commands.rs:40
swap.swap (cyclomatic 16) · ×31_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:227
grpc.handleStream (cyclomatic 21) · ×2REDACTED:73
parsingtransaction.tOutPut (cyclomatic 19) · ×21_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:56
parsingtransaction.parseTransactionFromData (cyclomatic 16) · ×21_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:4
What to do
Bring the 2 bodies over 30 down to 30 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::commands::handle_command (cyclomatic 38), grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::hardcap::handle_buy_and_sell_logic (cyclomatic 32). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 2 together lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 7.0 to about 7.3/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 30; a cleaner split scores higher.
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Cyclomatic Complexity in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
17 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::secondbuy::handle_detection_event at 139.
grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::secondbuy::handle_detection_event (cognitive 139) · ×6#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/secondbuy.rs:9
swap.swap (cognitive 25) · ×31_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:227
grpc.handleStream (cognitive 29) · ×2REDACTED:73
HttpSender::send (cognitive 48)#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/json-rpc-client/src/jsonrpc_client/http_sender.rs:99
What to do
Bring the 4 bodies over 30 down to 30 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::secondbuy::handle_detection_event (cognitive 139), grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::hardcap::handle_buy_and_sell_logic (cognitive 119), grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::commands::handle_command (cognitive 68). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 4 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 6.1 to about 7.8/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 30; a cleaner split scores higher.
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Cognitive Complexity in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes7.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
FunctionTooLong: grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::commands::handle_command · ×3#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/commands.rs:40
FileTooLong: src/instructions.rs#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/parsers/pump_interface/src/instructions.rs
TooManyMethods: BoughtTokenInfo#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/shared_state/src/lib.rs:28
What to do
Resolve the 3 FunctionTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with parsingtransaction.js (2), commands.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with instructions.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with lib.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate God Classes in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
+ 8 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 3 Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with instructions.rs (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Resolve the 3 Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with instructions.rs (2), token.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Resolve the 3 Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with logger.rs (2), hardcap.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Duplication in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
7 production modules (Cargo+npm), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations; 3 module(s) off the main sequence, with abstractness counted on 4 of the 7 (the rest declare no modelled class or interface, export only macros, declare types in source no model reads, or have no source directory of their own).
Off the main sequence: pump_interface · ×2
Off the main sequence: shared_state
What to do
Resolve the 2 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Coupling in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
6 test methods: 6 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e. The Rust suite contributes 6 `#[test]` function(s) across 3 file(s) declaring at least one; its unit/integration split is Cargo's own — 0 of those file(s) are integration-test targets under a crate's tests/ directory, and the rest are #[test] functions compiled into the crate they test.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
0 of 1032 shipped crate(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from crates.io over the crates a consumer compiles — this repository commits no Cargo.lock, so its graph was resolved here: its manifests' `[dependencies]` and `[build-dependencies]` closed over the crates.io index, each crate at the newest release its requirement admits (what a fresh `cargo generate-lockfile` picks, not a graph the repository has pinned). Crates it asks for ONLY under `[dev-dependencies]` are excluded: they are not compiled by anything that depends on this repository. This repository publishes itself under Apache-2.0, which is its own choice and is not judged here. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's crate dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares package.json, and the licences of those dependencies were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
1 deducted task-comment markers across 6879 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
TodoComment#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/commands.rs:68
What to do
Resolve the 1 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with commands.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Explicit Debt in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Every README, docs/ document and root guide parsed by its markup and measured in Unicode letters. Published: a runnable or packaged .NET project whose README (or a document it links, or a root guide) shows no example, and a root README naming none of three or more projects. Overview, licence, boilerplate, wall-of-text, empty-section and XML-doc rows are measured and withheld (counted in gaps) after adjudication. Deterministic, exhaustive, advisory.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: REDACTED scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.
6 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
REDACTED
REDACTED
What to do
Resolve the 6 REDACTED finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (4), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
semgrep found no security issues. semgrep hit a parse error in 3 file(s) — `#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/detectionlogs.json`, `#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/logs.json`, `#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/shredstreamproxy.sh` (line 25) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them.
What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.
Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.
Resolve the 23 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (23). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (23 issue-level).
Resolve the 15 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (15). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 warning-level).
Resolve the 4 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Resolve the 1 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.
What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.
Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.
What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Scored apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.
Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. SCORED, not informational.
Resolve the 1 Malicious package finding(s) in Malicious Dependencies — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d43_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC1 · Text alternatives1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
Coverage: Population: image/media elements — img, area, input[type=image], svg, video, object, embed, canvas — across the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and dynamic-attribute elements are skipped. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is NOT read by any producer, so it contributes no element to this population; where such a frontend is present the card discloses it as an analyzer gap rather than scoring around it.
A <canvas> with no aria-label/title and no inner fallback content can't be described by assistive tech. Add a name or fallback content. (×2) — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/index.html:100, 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/index.html:106
What to do
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC2 · Forms & labels4.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, a click handler on a plain element names the control it declares, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
Coverage: Population: form controls, buttons, links, fieldsets and known UI-library field components in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and spread/dynamic-attribute elements are skipped, so a control whose label arrives through a spread or a runtime expression is deliberately not judged. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one). (×2) — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:264, 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/index.html:43
What to do
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
Coverage: Population: the PARSED MARKUP documents (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx). The page-level checks — lang, title, single main landmark — fire ONCE PER FULL DOCUMENT (an <html> root) and never on a partial or component fragment, so a repo of fragments is assessed only on the per-element checks (heading order, table headers, iframe titles, meta-refresh, zoom). Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/index.html:99
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
Coverage: Population: styled elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx), plus in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files and CSS-in-JS literals. Colour contrast is computed from LITERAL colour pairs only (hex/rgb/hsl/named, including var() tokens and Tailwind neutral utilities) — computed, runtime-themed and external-CDN colour is never resolved, so this is a partial read of contrast by construction. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
`.refresh-btn:hover` moves (`transition: transform 0.3s ease`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/index.html:22
What to do
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
Coverage: Population: the repository's own tooling configuration — lint config, test and CI files — NOT the markup. It is read for a configured accessibility checker and an automated accessibility assertion (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse, or a native-toolkit equivalent), and it credits an INVOCATION, never a mention: a licence filename, an import comment or a doc reference earns no rung. Enforcement configured entirely outside the repository leaves no evidence here and cannot be credited.
No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (an accessibility check that can read your UI — no component framework was detected and your pages are rendered by server-side templates, which neither the JSX/Vue ESLint plugins nor the HTML-template linters can parse; run axe/pa11y over the rendered pages, or assert the accessibility invariants over that rendered HTML in the test suite you already have) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start by running that check over your rendered pages in CI. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 2 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.
What to do
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add an accessibility check that can read your UI — no component framework was detected and your pages are rendered by server-side templates, which neither the JSX/Vue ESLint plugins nor the HTML-template linters can parse; run axe/pa11y over the rendered pages, or assert the accessibility invariants over that rendered HTML in the test suite you already have, then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
What to do
The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.
Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.
Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.
Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 4 of 7 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.1 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
README.md names Node.js 18, but the repository declares engines `>=16.0.0`, engines `>=16.0.0`, engines `>=16.0.0`. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — README.md:153
2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/README.md names Node.js 18, but the repository declares engines `>=16.0.0`, engines `>=16.0.0`, engines `>=16.0.0`. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/README.md:47
What to do
Reconcile the README with reality: README.md names Node.js 18, but the repository declares engines `>=16.0.0`, engines `>=16.0.0`, engines `>=16.0.0`; 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/README.md names Node.js 18, but the repository declares engines `>=16.0.0`, engines `>=16.0.0`, engines `>=16.0.0`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.
Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P10 · Library API & versioning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.
Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries; off .NET, a library is the ecosystem's publication act (an npm package that is not private and names an entry point, a PyPI distribution with a build system, a Rust library crate, a Maven/Gradle module that publishes, a Go module with no package main, a gemspec, a Composer library, a SwiftPM library product, a pub.dev or Hex package), its surface is the share of types the language model records as public (Rust, Swift, Java, Kotlin, Go, Dart; not measured where the model records no type visibility or, as in TypeScript, only module-level export), and its version is read from the manifest, a semver CHANGELOG, release tooling or semver git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
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P2 · Observability8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.
`2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 23 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:23
`2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 38 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:38
`2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 48 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:48
`2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 66 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:66
`2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 69 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:69
`2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 74 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:74
`2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 80 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:80
`2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 82 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:82
`2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 91 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:91
`2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 99 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:99
`2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 121 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:121
`2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 126 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:126
`2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 130 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:130
`2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 143 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:143
`REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 27 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — REDACTED:27
`REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 64 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — REDACTED:64
`REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 78 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — REDACTED:78
`REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 94 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — REDACTED:94
`REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 102 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — REDACTED:102
`REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 108 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — REDACTED:108
`REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 142 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — REDACTED:142
`REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 143 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — REDACTED:143
`REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 144 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — REDACTED:144
`REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 145 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — REDACTED:145
`REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 149 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — REDACTED:149
`REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 154 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — REDACTED:154
`REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 159 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — REDACTED:159
`REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 167 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — REDACTED:167
`REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 175 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — REDACTED:175
`REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 185 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — REDACTED:185
`REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 191 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — REDACTED:191
`REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 198 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — REDACTED:198
`2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js` reports through `console.*` at line 14 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:14
`2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js` reports through `console.*` at line 28 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:28
`2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js` reports through `console.*` at line 33 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:33
`2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js` reports through `console.*` at line 36 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:36
`2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js` reports through `console.*` at line 39 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:39
`2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js` reports through `console.*` at line 67 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:67
`2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js` reports through `console.*` at line 74 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:74
`2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js` reports through `console.*` at line 76 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:76
What to do
Route service-code `console.*` output through the module's structured logger (with named fields), so delivery outcomes and failures reach the log pipeline with a level.
Add OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics (opentelemetry with tracing-opentelemetry) so requests are traceable across the system, not just health-probable.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add cargo-audit / cargo-deny (or clippy) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 0 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
What to do
Run what this repository's stack ships: cargo-audit / cargo-deny (or clippy) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
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P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.
Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.
A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.
What to do
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.
Method: Source scan: outbound HTTP clients and what bounds them — resilience handlers (Polly, AddStandardResilienceHandler) on .NET; on Go, the JVM, Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, PHP, Rust, Elixir, Swift, Dart and Erlang, a timeout, deadline, retry or breaker beside each call, or a process-wide client default (a framework-wide deadline such as Drupal core's, Laravel's or actix's awc counts). Exhaustive, deterministic.
`Client::new()` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout. (×2) — #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/jito.rs:89, #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/zeroslot.rs:88
`axios.post(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/services/notifications.js:96
What to do
Give every client a whole-request bound: `reqwest::Client::builder().timeout(Duration::from_secs(10))` (never `reqwest::get` or `Client::new()`, which have none), ureq's `timeout_global`, or wrap the call in `tokio::time::timeout`; add retry with back-off (`reqwest-retry`'s `RetryTransientMiddleware`, `backoff`) around dependencies that fail.
Bound every outbound call: pass `signal: AbortSignal.timeout(ms)` to `fetch`, set `timeout` on the axios instance (`axios.create({ timeout })`), and add retries with back-off (`axios-retry`, `p-retry`) and a breaker (`opossum`, `cockatiel`) around dependencies that fail.
Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.
Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from the language model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.
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R1 · Type Safety0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
0 typed · 22 plain JS — the untyped files are 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js, REDACTED, 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/index.js, 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/main.js, 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js, 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap(offchain).js (+16 more).
What to do
Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
React / JS · Code Health — Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386): a block is reported only where its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or were renamed as they were pasted but kept most of their constants, and where the copies carry enough code to stand on their own or the copied extent reaches 30 lines — so a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are both found and deliberately not reported, and a clean R10 is not a claim that nothing was copied.
Method: Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Masking finds the candidates; a block is reported when its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or when a renamed copy still agrees on most of its constants, AND the copies carry enough code to stand on their own — or when the copied extent reaches 30 lines. So a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are deliberately not counted. Deterministic.
1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/ and 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/ are near-verbatim copies of each other: 10 files are byte-identical under the same relative paths (~17978 lines; the trees hold 14 and 25 files). That is one structural fact, not 10 local ones: every edit made to one tree and not the other drifts silently, which is the failure whole-tree forks guarantee. Pick one tree as the single source and produce the other from it (generated, copied at build or release time, or re-exported) — or, if the copy is a stale snapshot nothing produces any more, delete it. Check first whether the copy is a deliberately published deliverable (a template consumers copy verbatim, a released sample frozen at a version); where it is, keep it produced from the source tree rather than edited in place. — REDACTED:1
5 of the duplicated blocks reported below have copies in at least two of the sibling directories 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC, 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC, 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket under the repository root. That concentration is one structural fact, not 5 local ones: the siblings replicate behaviour none of them owns, which is the shape of a missing shared module — a common library every sibling imports — rather than 5 separate extractions. Check first whether the siblings are deliberately standalone deliverables (scaffold templates, demo apps that must stay copy-pasteable); where they are, the duplication is the design and the per-block rows are the ones to act on. — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:1
1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:1 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:1 — these 2 files are line-for-line copies of one another — 182 lines are identical, in the same order, in every one of them — so this is one fact about the file set, not a block to extract. An edit made to one file and not the others changes behaviour silently, which is the failure a wholesale copy guarantees. Pick one file as the single source and derive the others from it (re-export it, spread it into the local overrides each variant genuinely needs, or generate the copies at build time) — the few lines that differ between the files are exactly the part each variant should still own. Check first whether the copies are deliberately standalone deliverables (a translation file seeded from its sibling and waiting to be translated); where they are, the duplication is the design, and the honest move is to mark the seeded file as untranslated rather than to let it pass as done. — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:1
1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:1 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:1 · 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket/swap.js:1 — these 3 files are line-for-line copies of one another — 156 lines are identical, in the same order, in every one of them — so this is one fact about the file set, not a block to extract. An edit made to one file and not the others changes behaviour silently, which is the failure a wholesale copy guarantees. Pick one file as the single source and derive the others from it (re-export it, spread it into the local overrides each variant genuinely needs, or generate the copies at build time) — the few lines that differ between the files are exactly the part each variant should still own. Check first whether the copies are deliberately standalone deliverables (a translation file seeded from its sibling and waiting to be translated); where they are, the duplication is the design, and the honest move is to mark the seeded file as untranslated rather than to let it pass as done. — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:1
REDACTED:1 · REDACTED:1 — these 2 files are line-for-line copies of one another — 125 lines are identical, in the same order, in every one of them — so this is one fact about the file set, not a block to extract. An edit made to one file and not the others changes behaviour silently, which is the failure a wholesale copy guarantees. Pick one file as the single source and derive the others from it (re-export it, spread it into the local overrides each variant genuinely needs, or generate the copies at build time) — the few lines that differ between the files are exactly the part each variant should still own. Check first whether the copies are deliberately standalone deliverables (a translation file seeded from its sibling and waiting to be translated); where they are, the duplication is the design, and the honest move is to mark the seeded file as untranslated rather than to let it pass as done. — REDACTED:1
1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:1 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:1 — these 2 files are line-for-line copies of one another — 95 lines are identical, in the same order, in every one of them — so this is one fact about the file set, not a block to extract. An edit made to one file and not the others changes behaviour silently, which is the failure a wholesale copy guarantees. Pick one file as the single source and derive the others from it (re-export it, spread it into the local overrides each variant genuinely needs, or generate the copies at build time) — the few lines that differ between the files are exactly the part each variant should still own. Check first whether the copies are deliberately standalone deliverables (a translation file seeded from its sibling and waiting to be translated); where they are, the duplication is the design, and the honest move is to mark the seeded file as untranslated rather than to let it pass as done. — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:1
2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/index.js:97 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/main.js:75 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/index.js:97
2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/server.js:69 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/server.js:114 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/server.js:69
2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/server.js:88 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/server.js:105 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/server.js:88
2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/services/notifications.js:136 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/services/notifications.js:148 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/services/notifications.js:136
2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/utils/logger.js:109 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/utils/logger.js:162 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/utils/logger.js:109
2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/server.js:123 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/server.js:141 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/server.js:123
1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/main.js:9 · 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:20 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:20 · 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket/swap.js:21 — the 4 copies are spread across 4 files, and the CITED SPAN is a run of MODULE-LEVEL DECLARATIONS — bindings the module declares and exports — rather than statements with a call site. Do not read this as an extract-a-helper row: a call expression cannot stand where a declaration was, and putting one there would delete the names themselves, which are what the rest of the codebase imports. What actually repeats here is the INITIALISER — the same expression shape written once per binding. So give that expression one name (a small helper the initialisers call, or a shared base value they are each derived from) and keep every binding under the name it already has. Where the run is an enumeration — one binding per distinct thing, differing precisely in the thing each one names — the repetition IS the enumeration and collapsing it would delete entries; consider instead whether the set belongs in one exported table the individual names are read out of. Reported because the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/main.js:9
What to do
Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.
React / JS · Architecture — Conformance to the detected frontend architecture layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules (D-386).
Method: Conformance to the detected frontend layout (feature-sliced / layered src) plus cross-package deep-import rules, over the module graph. Deterministic.
3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket/swap.js:13 reaches into another package with a relative path (./logger.js) — import the package by name instead. — 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket/swap.js:13
What to do
Fix the listed violations: import through public entries (package exports / slice index), never reach into another layer or package's internals.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
(anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 20 and cognitive complexity 28; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. (×2) — REDACTED:86, REDACTED:86
swap has cyclomatic complexity 16 and cognitive complexity 25; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. (×3) — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:227, 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:227, 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket/swap.js:191
getSplTokenBalance has cyclomatic complexity 12 and cognitive complexity 12; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. (×2) — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:89, 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:89
tOutPut has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 9; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. (×2) — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:56, 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:56
What to do
Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R4 · Test Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.
Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.
0% of 22 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph — 'production' here is the RESIDUE: every source file left once tests, tooling, generated output, config, declarations and declaration-only modules, fixture corpora, type fixtures, behaviour-free data modules, re-export barrels, registration/constant data modules and service workers are set aside, so the percentage is taken over a smaller denominator than the workspace's file count
What to do
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D30 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).
Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D30, which answers dependency vulnerabilities for every ecosystem). Deterministic.
What to do
Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.
Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.
test ✗ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.
What to do
Add a test runner (vitest / jest / playwright) and eslint and type checking (adopt TypeScript, or type-check the existing JavaScript with `checkJs`) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code9.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
2 file(s) (~325 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis. This package DOES declare main/module/exports — but every declared target is missing from the scanned tree, which is what a build-output entry (dist/, lib/, out/) looks like before the package is built. Point a declared target at the source entry, or build the package before scanning, so reachability can follow it. — 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket
Unreachable from the 3 application, 0 tooling and 0 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. This repository declares no build, type-check or test script, so nothing here would fail on a wrong deletion — confirm by hand that nothing loads each file (including by a path built at runtime) before removing it. An undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
no import path from any entry point (3 application, 0 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make (×2) — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap(offchain).js, 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/swap(offchain).js
Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal. (×18) — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:136, 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:28, 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/config.js:162, …
What to do
Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.
Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.
Declared in 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it. (×3)
What to do
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R9 · Circular Imports3.2 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js → 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js → 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:7
Other · Security — Read from this repository's Rust source: cryptographic hygiene (weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source) and outbound TLS (certificate validation, protocol version) — facts about code that hold whether or not it serves anything itself. Markup this repository SHIPS is scored for third-party script integrity whether or not the repository serves it itself, since a page handed to a consumer runs in that consumer’s origin. The server controls — HTTPS enforcement, HSTS, cookie flags, input validation — are read from a Rust server this repository starts itself, and its production Rust starts none. What serves its HTTP is outside the Rust source, and only what this card names about it was assessed.
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.
`https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/chart.js` is executed by this page with no Subresource Integrity. Whoever can answer that request — the CDN, anyone who compromises it, anyone on the network path — runs arbitrary script in this page's origin, with its session. The URL also names no version, so it resolves to whatever that origin serves at fetch time — the executed bytes can change with nobody touching this repository. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/index.html:9
What to do
Pin third-party scripts and verify them: name an exact version in the URL and add an `integrity="sha384-…"` hash alongside `crossorigin="anonymous"` (both are required — an integrity hash on a cross-origin script without `crossorigin` is not evaluated, it blocks the script). Where the vendor ships a continuously-updated loader and publishes no stable hash (tag managers, analytics, chat widgets), Subresource Integrity is not available: constrain it instead with a `Content-Security-Policy` that names the exact origins allowed to execute, and drop the script from the pages that do not need it. Where the page is shipped inside a package that others host, prefer vendoring the asset and serving it from the app’s own origin, so no consumer inherits a third-party dependency they did not choose.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. The same rule reads Python’s `subprocess.Popen`, Dart’s `Process.start`, Ruby’s `Open3.popen3`, and Scala’s JDK process starts (`new ProcessBuilder(…).start()` with no `redirectErrorStream`/`redirectError`/`redirectOutput`/`inheritIO`, `Runtime.getRuntime.exec`) where one of `getInputStream`/`getErrorStream` is read and the other never while `waitFor()` is called or the read stream is read to its end. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. On a repository with no .NET source it reads TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths and `.d.ts` not) with the same rule: a function or method with a parameter typed as a document value — `unknown`, `any`, `object`, `Record<string, unknown|any>`, a JSON alias (`JsonValue`, `JSONObject`, …) or a DOM node global the file does not rebind — that calls itself (bare, or through `this` for a method, or hands itself to a call over the value as in `value.map(walk)`) with something it took out of that value and never through an ancestor accessor such as `closest()` or `parentElement`, that is exported or reached from an exported function (a public method of the same exported class) taking such a value, and that names no depth, level, nesting, recursion, remaining or budget anywhere and threads no `+`/`-` arithmetic through a self-call. Plain JavaScript is not read: with no annotation nothing tells a parsed document from a tree the code built itself. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. On a repository with no .NET source the same ownership questions are read in JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not): a class declaring `dispose()`, `[Symbol.dispose]()` or `[Symbol.asyncDispose]()` that disposes a field it was handed through a constructor parameter typed as a repository interface or resolved by a dependency-injection container; that assigns a field only ever from `new X(…)` of a disposable class and neither releases it anywhere in the class nor names it in its disposal member or a method that member calls, nor hands it to anything else; and a `const`/`let` local built from literals only whose every reference opens a statement operating on a non-release member of it. A class is disposable when every repository declaration of its name declares or inherits a disposal member, or when it is a documented library disposable (`vscode` EventEmitter, CancellationTokenSource and Disposable; three.js geometries, materials, textures, render targets, renderers, controls and composers). The finalizer arm has no JavaScript counterpart: a class cannot declare one. Dart is read for the owned-and-never-released arm: a Flutter `State` (or a class declaring `dispose()`/`close()`) whose library-private field is written only with direct creations of a framework controller, `FocusNode`, `StreamController` or periodic `Timer` (or a `.listen(…)` into a field declared `StreamSubscription`), which nothing in the class or its library releases (`dispose`/`close`/`cancel`) and which is never handed on except as a named argument. Ruby is read for the owned-and-never-released arm and the abandoned-local arm: a class declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose instance variable is written only with a blockless core descriptor creation (`File.open`/`new`, `Tempfile`, `Dir.open`, `IO.popen`, the `socket` and `openssl` socket classes) that no method of the class closes and that is never handed on (passed, returned, stored, exposed by `attr_reader`, delegated) — a class whose superclass or mixin lies outside the repository is not judged — and a blockless creation read through and dropped (`File.open(path).read`) or held in a local that is never closed, returned, passed or stored (a `&:read` block-pass, an `autoclose: false` borrow and a `fileno` hand-over are not abandonment). PHP is read for the same two arms: a class (not a trait, and not one using a trait) declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose `private` property (or a `final` class's `protected` one) is written only with a direct core `fopen`, `tmpfile`, `popen`, `proc_open`, `fsockopen`, `stream_socket_client`/`server` or `opendir` that nothing in the class closes (`fclose`, `pclose`, `closedir`, `unset`, a reset to `null`) and that is never handed on, and a handle held in a function's local, or read through as the argument of a reader, that is never closed, returned, passed, captured or stored; a `php://` stream, `curl_init`, `SplFileObject`, `PDO` and a function the repository declares under the core name are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether async functions that make a cancellable request accept or pass on an AbortSignal (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same question: every named async function that itself makes a request an AbortSignal can cancel (global `fetch`, axios and its file-local instances, ky, ofetch) counts, and it is compliant when its parameters or body name a signal or it hands one of its own parameters to the request as options; signatures a framework fixes (JSX event handlers, route and lifecycle exports, request-first handlers, `override`, `'use server'` modules, TanStack `mutationFn`) are exempt unless they take a signal. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 0/10 async functions that make a cancellable request (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch) accept an AbortSignal or pass one on, so a request keeps running after whatever wanted it has given up — a page navigated away from, an unmounted component, a timed-out job. Take a `signal` (or an options object that carries one) and hand it to the request; where nothing could ever cancel the call, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against how the function is used.
`getResponse` awaits `axios.get(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `axios.get(url, { signal })`. (×3) — 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket/swap.js:77, 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:121, 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:121
`sendDiscordMessage` awaits `axios.post(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `axios.post(url, { signal })`. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/services/notifications.js:90
`loadStatus` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:144
`loadRiskMetrics` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:161
`loadPositions` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:183
`loadHistory` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:195
`loadConfiguration` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:207
`emergencyCloseAll` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:350
What to do
Thread an AbortSignal through async functions that make requests, so the work stops when its caller gives up.
Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.
Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back.
Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.
Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped3.6 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.
Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
`data.bot.status` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:152
`position.mint.substring(0,8)` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through markup built here with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:263
`position.mint` is text this program did not author, and it is written into a script or style context through markup built here with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. A script or style context needs its own escaping (or a JSON serialiser that escapes `<`); better, pass the value through a data attribute. (×2) — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:264, 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:277
`this.formatDuration(position.holdTime)` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through markup built here with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:274
`new Date(trade.timestamp).toLocaleString()` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through markup built here with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:299
`trade.type.toUpperCase()` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through markup built here with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:302
`trade.tokenMint.substring(0,8)` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through markup built here with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:306
`item.label` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through markup built here with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:334
`item.value` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through markup built here with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:335
What to do
Each finding names the expression, the attribute it lands in and the line. Confirm the value's origin from the read this analyzer traced, then escape it at the sink or validate it against the shape the attribute accepts before interpolating.
Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.
Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a `for` loop leaves the `RefCell` it is walking alone — safe Rust rejects a body that changes the collection its loop borrows at compile time, except through interior mutability: a `RefCell` borrowed in the loop's header stays borrowed until the loop ends, so a `borrow_mut()` of it inside the body panics with `already borrowed: BorrowMutError` and the remaining elements are never seen.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal`/`verbose`/`silly`/`http`/`log` call on a receiver named for a logger, in a package whose own or an enclosing `package.json` declares a logger that carries values as fields (pino, pino-http, nestjs-pino, Fastify, winston, bunyan, tslog, LogTape, roarr), whose first deciding argument is a template literal with substitutions; an object-literal fields argument is stepped over, a plain string message clears the call. Python is read the same way: a `debug`/`info`/`warning`/`error`/`exception`/`critical`/`log` call on a logger in a file that imports the standard library’s `logging` or structlog (loguru, which formats at the call, is not judged), whose message is a whole f-string with a non-constant field; a `%`-formatted, `.format()`-ed or concatenated message is not convicted, as in C#. PHP is read the same way: a PSR-3 level call (`emergency`…`debug`, `log`) on a logger (`$logger`, `$this->logger`, Laravel’s `Log::`, `logger()`, `\Drupal::logger()`) in a package whose `composer.json` requires a PSR-3 logger or a framework that hands one out (psr/log, Monolog, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal, CakePHP), or a file that imports one, whose message is a double-quoted string interpolating a variable; a single-quoted message clears the call, and `sprintf` or `.` concatenation is not convicted, as in C#. Dart is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on Sentry’s structured logger (`Sentry.logger`) whose message is a whole string literal interpolating a value (`$name`, `${…}`); the `Sentry.logger.fmt` template API clears the call. Dart that logs only through loggers with one message and no fields (package:logging, package:logger, talker, dart:developer) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Ruby is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on the console gem’s `Console` (declared by a Gemfile, gemspec or Gemfile.lock, or required) or, where SemanticLogger, Ougai or dry-logger is declared or required, on a receiver named for a logger (`logger`, `@logger`, `Rails.logger`, `log`), whose first deciding argument is, as the whole argument, a double-quoted string interpolating a non-constant value (`#{…}`, `#@ivar`); a plain literal clears the call, keyword arguments are the fields, and a block, `%`-format or `+` concatenation is not convicted. Ruby that logs only through the standard Logger (Rails.logger) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Deterministic.
`info!` at line 163 is handed a format string with `{…}` values in it, so tracing records one finished `message` field — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Record the values as fields beside a constant message instead: `info!(order_id = %order_id, status = ?status, "order status updated")` (`%` records a value by its `Display`, `?` by its `Debug`, a bare name as itself), which a JSON subscriber, OpenTelemetry or a log store keeps as queryable keys. An error goes in as a field too: `error = %err`. — #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/dex/pump_fun.rs:163
`info!` at line 208 is handed a format string with `{…}` values in it, so tracing records one finished `message` field — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Record the values as fields beside a constant message instead: `info!(order_id = %order_id, status = ?status, "order status updated")` (`%` records a value by its `Display`, `?` by its `Debug`, a bare name as itself), which a JSON subscriber, OpenTelemetry or a log store keeps as queryable keys. An error goes in as a field too: `error = %err`. — #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/dex/pump_fun.rs:208
`info!` at line 273 is handed a format string with `{…}` values in it, so tracing records one finished `message` field — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Record the values as fields beside a constant message instead: `info!(order_id = %order_id, status = ?status, "order status updated")` (`%` records a value by its `Display`, `?` by its `Debug`, a bare name as itself), which a JSON subscriber, OpenTelemetry or a log store keeps as queryable keys. An error goes in as a field too: `error = %err`. — #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/dex/pump_fun.rs:273
`info!` at line 304 is handed a format string with `{…}` values in it, so tracing records one finished `message` field — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Record the values as fields beside a constant message instead: `info!(order_id = %order_id, status = ?status, "order status updated")` (`%` records a value by its `Display`, `?` by its `Debug`, a bare name as itself), which a JSON subscriber, OpenTelemetry or a log store keeps as queryable keys. An error goes in as a field too: `error = %err`. — #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/dex/pump_fun.rs:304
`info!` at line 320 is handed a format string with `{…}` values in it, so tracing records one finished `message` field — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Record the values as fields beside a constant message instead: `info!(order_id = %order_id, status = ?status, "order status updated")` (`%` records a value by its `Display`, `?` by its `Debug`, a bare name as itself), which a JSON subscriber, OpenTelemetry or a log store keeps as queryable keys. An error goes in as a field too: `error = %err`. — #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/dex/pump_fun.rs:320
`info!` at line 21 is handed a format string with `{…}` values in it, so tracing records one finished `message` field — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Record the values as fields beside a constant message instead: `info!(order_id = %order_id, status = ?status, "order status updated")` (`%` records a value by its `Display`, `?` by its `Debug`, a bare name as itself), which a JSON subscriber, OpenTelemetry or a log store keeps as queryable keys. An error goes in as a field too: `error = %err`. — #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/core/token.rs:21
`info!` at line 28 is handed a format string with `{…}` values in it, so tracing records one finished `message` field — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Record the values as fields beside a constant message instead: `info!(order_id = %order_id, status = ?status, "order status updated")` (`%` records a value by its `Display`, `?` by its `Debug`, a bare name as itself), which a JSON subscriber, OpenTelemetry or a log store keeps as queryable keys. An error goes in as a field too: `error = %err`. — #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/core/token.rs:28
`info!` at line 35 is handed a format string with `{…}` values in it, so tracing records one finished `message` field — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Record the values as fields beside a constant message instead: `info!(order_id = %order_id, status = ?status, "order status updated")` (`%` records a value by its `Display`, `?` by its `Debug`, a bare name as itself), which a JSON subscriber, OpenTelemetry or a log store keeps as queryable keys. An error goes in as a field too: `error = %err`. — #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/core/token.rs:35
Statically assessed 13 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (24%; ≈26% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 42 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.
X10 Duplicated predicate — 10 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 4 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: this repository stores data through 'mongodb' (#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/commands.rs:4) but declares no persisted model this check reads (Diesel table! columns, SeaORM entity / Diesel model / sqlx FromRow struct fields, CREATE TABLE and ALTER TABLE … ADD columns in SQL migrations and SQL string literals). Personal data may be written through raw SQL or a hosted backend, so whether its changes need an audit trail could not be established, and the trail's absence is not scored.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: this repository stores data through 'mongodb' (#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/commands.rs:4) but declares no persisted model this check reads (Diesel table! columns, SeaORM entity / Diesel model / sqlx FromRow struct fields, CREATE TABLE and ALTER TABLE … ADD columns in SQL migrations and SQL string literals). Personal data may be written through raw SQL or a hosted backend, so whether a retention limit applies here could not be established, and its absence is not scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: this repository stores data through 'mongodb' (#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/commands.rs:4) but declares no persisted model this check reads (Diesel table! columns, SeaORM entity / Diesel model / sqlx FromRow struct fields, CREATE TABLE and ALTER TABLE … ADD columns in SQL migrations and SQL string literals). Personal data may be written through raw SQL or a hosted backend, so whether data-subject rights apply here could not be established, and their absence is not scored.
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
Not included — 53 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's JavaScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's; Rust with no dependency-injection crate has no container to hand one lifetime's instance to another — every value is owned by the code that builds it, and the borrow checker rejects a longer-lived value keeping a borrow of a shorter-lived one.
AX2 Stateful singletons — Not applicable: Rust's compiler refuses unsynchronised shared mutation — a value shared across threads must be Sync — so the race this check looks for cannot be written. TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — compose up failed (exit 17 — an image could not be built) — rustapp Pulling rustapp Warning pull access denied for francescoxx/rustapp, repository does not exist or may require 'docker login': denied: requested access to the resource is denied failed to solve: failed to read dockerfile: open Dockerfile: no such file or directory; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: this repository stores data through 'mongodb' (#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/commands.rs:4) but declares no persisted model this check reads (Diesel table! columns, SeaORM entity / Diesel model / sqlx FromRow struct fields, CREATE TABLE and ALTER TABLE … ADD columns in SQL migrations and SQL string literals). Personal data may be written through raw SQL or a hosted backend, so the absence of a personal-data field here is not evidence that none is stored, and encryption at rest is not scored over a subject that could not be established.
C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — this repository starts no server another machine can reach (no actix-web HttpServer, axum::serve, Rocket launch, warp::serve, poem or salvo Server, tonic Server::builder, hyper or tiny_http server outside examples and tests, none bound beyond loopback). Access control is therefore N/A here — a crate is authorized by the application that serves it, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
D10 Test Quality — ~3 lines of test source are present (.rs) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — the .rs suite was found but not re-run
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Not scored — 61 direct Cargo declaration(s) were read, but the outdated signal needs crates.io, and no committed Cargo.lock resolves them to versions, so this dimension's own question is only partly answered. NOT a finding that these dependencies are current or healthy.
D16 Bus Factor — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D21 Naming Consistency — Naming consistency is measured on C# only; JavaScript, Rust not measured.
D22 Internal API Consistency — API consistency is measured on C# only; the exposed Rust surface was not measured.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ projects each declaring an entity of their own. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C# and Visual Basic comments only — this repository's production source is .rs, which was left unread. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D27 Navigability — D27 counts a call into the standard library or a dependency as unresolved for this repository's language (.rs), so too few call sites counted as resolved to assess navigability. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
D34 Knowledge Freshness — too few commits to judge knowledge freshness
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D44 Platform End-of-Life — Platform end-of-life not assessed — this repository declares no platform this pass reads
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (14 value object(s))
ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, and a call made through an inferred or generic receiver has no resolvable owner in the source. Reported as guidance rather than measured
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala, and none was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `cargo install cargo-llvm-cov`, then `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for `#[bench]`, criterion's `bench_function`/`bench_with_input`, `#[divan::bench]` or `#[library_benchmark]` in any `.rs` file, or criterion, divan, iai or a `[[bench]]` target in a Cargo.toml, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not applicable: Rust spells out every heap allocation and makes borrowed slices (&[T], &str) its ordinary parameter types, so the allocation-aware style this card rewards elsewhere is the language's baseline rather than a rung to climb. TypeScript/JavaScript runs on a garbage-collected runtime that gives a program no allocation-control idiom to choose on a hot path — no pools, stack allocation or value types — so allocation awareness is not something this code can be rated on.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Rust's compiler refuses the unsynchronised version: a collection shared between a callback's thread and the waiting body must be `Sync`, which a `Vec`, `VecDeque` or `HashMap` is only behind a `Mutex`/`RwLock`, so the race this check looks for cannot be written in safe Rust. TypeScript/JavaScript runs every callback on the one thread that owns its objects: a callback runs only when the body waiting on it has yielded, never alongside it, and a worker thread receives a COPY of what it is sent. A SharedArrayBuffer carries raw bytes, never an Array, Map or Set, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
AC2 · Forms & labels· <button> with no accessible text · ×2
<button> with no accessible text 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:264— A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one).
<button> with no accessible text 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/index.html:43— A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one).
Serious — 132 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×15
REDACTED
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X2 · Cancellation propagation· Async function without AbortSignal · ×10
Async function without AbortSignal: getResponse 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket/swap.js:77— `getResponse` awaits `axios.get(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `axios.get(url, { signal })`.
Async function without AbortSignal: getResponse 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:121— `getResponse` awaits `axios.get(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `axios.get(url, { signal })`.
Async function without AbortSignal: sendDiscordMessage 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/services/notifications.js:90— `sendDiscordMessage` awaits `axios.post(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `axios.post(url, { signal })`.
Async function without AbortSignal: loadStatus 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:144— `loadStatus` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`.
Async function without AbortSignal: loadRiskMetrics 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:161— `loadRiskMetrics` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`.
Async function without AbortSignal: loadPositions 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:183— `loadPositions` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`.
Async function without AbortSignal: loadHistory 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:195— `loadHistory` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`.
Async function without AbortSignal: loadConfiguration 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:207— `loadConfiguration` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`.
Async function without AbortSignal: emergencyCloseAll 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:350— `emergencyCloseAll` awaits `fetch(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `fetch(url, { signal })`.
Async function without AbortSignal: getResponse 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:121— `getResponse` awaits `axios.get(…)` but neither accepts an AbortSignal nor passes one on, so its caller cannot stop the request once it has started. Accept `{ signal }` and pass it through: `axios.get(url, { signal })`.
X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped· Untrusted text written into markup unescaped · ×10
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:152— `data.bot.status` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:263— `position.mint.substring(0,8)` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through markup built here with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:264— `position.mint` is text this program did not author, and it is written into a script or style context through markup built here with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. A script or style context needs its own escaping (or a JSON serialiser that escapes `<`); better, pass the value through a data attribute.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:274— `this.formatDuration(position.holdTime)` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through markup built here with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:277— `position.mint` is text this program did not author, and it is written into a script or style context through markup built here with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. A script or style context needs its own escaping (or a JSON serialiser that escapes `<`); better, pass the value through a data attribute.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:299— `new Date(trade.timestamp).toLocaleString()` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through markup built here with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:302— `trade.type.toUpperCase()` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through markup built here with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:306— `trade.tokenMint.substring(0,8)` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through markup built here with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:334— `item.label` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through markup built here with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/dashboard.js:335— `item.value` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through markup built here with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::secondbuy::handle_detection_event (cognitive 139) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/secondbuy.rs:9— grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::secondbuy::handle_detection_event has cognitive complexity 139 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 23 (127 pts), loops 2 (8 pts), boolean chains 3, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 110). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::hardcap::handle_buy_and_sell_logic (cognitive 119) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/hardcap.rs:1— grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::hardcap::handle_buy_and_sell_logic has cognitive complexity 119 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 25 (103 pts), loops 2 (8 pts), match/switch 1 (5 pts), boolean chains 3 (nesting depth added 88). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::commands::handle_command (cognitive 68) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/commands.rs:40— grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::commands::handle_command has cognitive complexity 68 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 32 (56 pts), match/switch 5 (9 pts), loops 1 (3 pts) (nesting depth added 30). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::shred_stream::reconcile_flows (cognitive 24) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/shred_stream.rs:147— grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::shred_stream::reconcile_flows has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 6 (17 pts), match/switch 2 (5 pts), boolean chains 1, loops 1 (nesting depth added 14). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::core::tx::new_signed_and_send (cognitive 20) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/core/tx.rs:105— grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::core::tx::new_signed_and_send has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11 (20 pts) (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::shred_stream::reconcile_sells (cognitive 19) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/shred_stream.rs:371— grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::shred_stream::reconcile_sells has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9 (15 pts), loops 2, boolean chains 1, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::commands::handle_command (cyclomatic 38) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/commands.rs:40— grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::commands::handle_command has cyclomatic complexity 38 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::hardcap::handle_buy_and_sell_logic (cyclomatic 32) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/hardcap.rs:1— grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::hardcap::handle_buy_and_sell_logic has cyclomatic complexity 32 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::secondbuy::handle_detection_event (cyclomatic 30) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/secondbuy.rs:9— grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::secondbuy::handle_detection_event has cyclomatic complexity 30 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
swap.swap (cyclomatic 16) 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:227— swap.swap has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
swap.swap (cyclomatic 16) 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:227— swap.swap has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
swap.swap (cyclomatic 16) 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket/swap.js:191— swap.swap has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
swap.swap (cognitive 25) 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:227— swap.swap has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9 (18 pts), boolean chains 3, error handling 2 (3 pts), loops 1 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
swap.swap (cognitive 25) 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:227— swap.swap has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9 (18 pts), boolean chains 3, error handling 2 (3 pts), loops 1 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
swap.swap (cognitive 25) 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket/swap.js:191— swap.swap has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9 (18 pts), boolean chains 3, error handling 2 (3 pts), loops 1 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
FunctionTooLong: grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::commands::handle_command #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/commands.rs:40— FunctionTooLong — grpc_raydium_pool_monitoring_rust::commands::handle_command runs 127 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 27 over it, 1.27× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
FunctionTooLong: parsingtransaction.parseTransactionData 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:122— FunctionTooLong — parseTransactionData runs 125 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 25 over it, 1.25× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
FunctionTooLong: parsingtransaction.parseTransactionData 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:122— FunctionTooLong — parseTransactionData runs 125 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 25 over it, 1.25× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/parsers/pump_interface/src/instructions.rs:890— #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/parsers/pump_interface/src/instructions.rs:890-901 | #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/parsers/pump_interface/src/instructions.rs:1520-1531 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/parsers/pump_interface/src/instructions.rs:974— #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/parsers/pump_interface/src/instructions.rs:974-985 | #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/parsers/pump_interface/src/instructions.rs:1598-1609 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/parsers/pump_interface/src/instructions.rs:1010— #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/parsers/pump_interface/src/instructions.rs:1010-1021 | #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/parsers/pump_interface/src/instructions.rs:1634-1645 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/parsers/pump_interface/src/instructions.rs:887— #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/parsers/pump_interface/src/instructions.rs:887-895 | #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/parsers/pump_interface/src/instructions.rs:1201-1209 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/parsers/pump_interface/src/instructions.rs:1007— #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/parsers/pump_interface/src/instructions.rs:1007-1015 | #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/parsers/pump_interface/src/instructions.rs:1323-1331 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/core/token.rs:67— #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/core/token.rs:67-75 | #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/core/token.rs:94-102 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/common/logger.rs:34— #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/common/logger.rs:34-39 | #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/logger.rs:34-39 — before extracting anything, compare `#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/common/logger.rs` and `#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/logger.rs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 34 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/common/logger.rs:50— #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/common/logger.rs:50-55 | #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/logger.rs:50-55 — before extracting anything, compare `#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/common/logger.rs` and `#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/logger.rs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 34 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/hardcap.rs:65— #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/hardcap.rs:65-70 | #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/hardcap.rs:124-129 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Outbound HTTP without resilience #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/jito.rs:89— `Client::new()` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout.
Outbound HTTP without resilience #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/zeroslot.rs:88— `Client::new()` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout.
Outbound HTTP without resilience 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/services/notifications.js:96— `axios.post(` makes an outbound HTTP call, and nothing bounds it: no timeout, deadline, retry or circuit breaker is set for it here, and the client has no process-wide default. A slow or failing dependency will hold this service's request, thread or connection until the call gives up on its own — or never, for a client with no default timeout.
Complex function swap (cyclomatic 16, cognitive 25) 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:227— swap has cyclomatic complexity 16 and cognitive complexity 25; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function swap (cyclomatic 16, cognitive 25) 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:227— swap has cyclomatic complexity 16 and cognitive complexity 25; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function swap (cyclomatic 16, cognitive 25) 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket/swap.js:191— swap has cyclomatic complexity 16 and cognitive complexity 25; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
AC1 · Text alternatives· <canvas> without a text alternative · ×2
<canvas> without a text alternative 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/index.html:100— A <canvas> with no aria-label/title and no inner fallback content can't be described by assistive tech. Add a name or fallback content.
<canvas> without a text alternative 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/index.html:106— A <canvas> with no aria-label/title and no inner fallback content can't be described by assistive tech. Add a name or fallback content.
grpc.handleStream (cyclomatic 21) REDACTED:73— grpc.handleStream has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 2 of the 21 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 86). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
grpc.handleStream (cyclomatic 21) REDACTED:73— grpc.handleStream has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 2 of the 21 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 86). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
parsingtransaction.tOutPut (cyclomatic 19) 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:56— parsingtransaction.tOutPut has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). Of this number, 12 points are the body's own statements and 7 belong to 2 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
parsingtransaction.tOutPut (cyclomatic 19) 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:56— parsingtransaction.tOutPut has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). Of this number, 12 points are the body's own statements and 7 belong to 2 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
parsingtransaction.parseTransactionFromData (cyclomatic 16) 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:4— parsingtransaction.parseTransactionFromData has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). Of this number, 9 points are the body's own statements and 7 belong to 2 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
parsingtransaction.parseTransactionFromData (cyclomatic 16) 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:4— parsingtransaction.parseTransactionFromData has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). Of this number, 9 points are the body's own statements and 7 belong to 2 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
grpc.handleStream (cognitive 29) REDACTED:73— grpc.handleStream has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12 (19 pts), boolean chains 4, error handling 2, loops 2, ternaries 2 (nesting depth added 7). Most of this is not in the body itself: 1 of the 29 points is its own statement and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 86). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
grpc.handleStream (cognitive 29) REDACTED:73— grpc.handleStream has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12 (19 pts), boolean chains 4, error handling 2, loops 2, ternaries 2 (nesting depth added 7). Most of this is not in the body itself: 1 of the 29 points is its own statement and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 86). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/jito.rs:54— #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/jito.rs:54-61 | #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/zeroslot.rs:51-58 — before extracting anything, compare `#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/jito.rs` and `#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/zeroslot.rs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 85 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/common/logger.rs:41— #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/common/logger.rs:41-48 | #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/logger.rs:41-48 — before extracting anything, compare `#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/common/logger.rs` and `#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/logger.rs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 34 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/jito.rs:171— #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/jito.rs:171-180 | #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/zeroslot.rs:170-179 — before extracting anything, compare `#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/jito.rs` and `#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/zeroslot.rs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 85 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/core/tx.rs:163— #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/core/tx.rs:163-172 | #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/core/tx.rs:191-200 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Off the main sequence: pump_interface — pump_interface: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 1 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: jito-block-engine-json-rpc-client — jito-block-engine-json-rpc-client: abstractness 0.20, instability 0.00, distance 0.80 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 1 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2 locations) 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/services/notifications.js:136— 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/services/notifications.js:136 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/services/notifications.js:148 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2 locations) 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/utils/logger.js:109— 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/utils/logger.js:109 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/utils/logger.js:162 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 20, cognitive 28) REDACTED:86— (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 20 and cognitive complexity 28; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 20, cognitive 28) REDACTED:86— (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 20 and cognitive complexity 28; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function getSplTokenBalance (cyclomatic 12, cognitive 12) 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:89— getSplTokenBalance has cyclomatic complexity 12 and cognitive complexity 12; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function getSplTokenBalance (cyclomatic 12, cognitive 12) 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:89— getSplTokenBalance has cyclomatic complexity 12 and cognitive complexity 12; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function tOutPut (cyclomatic 11, cognitive 9) 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:56— tOutPut has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 9; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Complex function tOutPut (cyclomatic 11, cognitive 9) 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:56— tOutPut has cyclomatic complexity 11 and cognitive complexity 9; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.
Dead file (~7 LoC) 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap(offchain).js— no import path from any entry point (3 application, 0 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
Dead file (~7 LoC) 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/swap(offchain).js— no import path from any entry point (3 application, 0 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make
AC3 · Page structure· Heading level jumps from h1 to h3 · ×1
Heading level jumps from h1 to h3 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/index.html:99— Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety· Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard · ×1
Animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/index.html:22— `.refresh-btn:hover` moves (`transition: transform 0.3s ease`) and nothing reads prefers-reduced-motion for it — no @media (prefers-reduced-motion) rule for this element, no reset this project loads — so a motion-sensitive user cannot turn it off (WCAG 2.3.3). Declare it under @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference), or neutralise it under reduce.
AC7 · A11y enforcement· Accessibility enforcement below the top rung · ×1
Accessibility enforcement below the top rung — No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (an accessibility check that can read your UI — no component framework was detected and your pages are rendered by server-side templates, which neither the JSX/Vue ESLint plugins nor the HTML-template linters can parse; run axe/pa11y over the rendered pages, or assert the accessibility invariants over that rendered HTML in the test suite you already have) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start by running that check over your rendered pages in CI. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 2 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.
TodoComment #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/commands.rs:68— // TODO: encrypt `key` before storing, e.g. AES with ENCRYPTION_KEY — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
HttpSender::send (cognitive 48) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/json-rpc-client/src/jsonrpc_client/http_sender.rs:99— HttpSender::send has cognitive complexity 48 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 7 (29 pts), match/switch 4 (17 pts), boolean chains 1, loops 1 (nesting depth added 35). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
FileTooLong: src/instructions.rs #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/parsers/pump_interface/src/instructions.rs— FileTooLong — 1395 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted), declaring 62 free functions. The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 895 over it, 2.79× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
TooManyMethods: BoughtTokenInfo #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/shared_state/src/lib.rs:28— TooManyMethods — 47 methods. The bar is 30 methods; this is 17 over it, 1.57× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
Duplicated block (51 lines × 2) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/jito.rs:120— #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/jito.rs:120-170 | #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/zeroslot.rs:119-169 — before extracting anything, compare `#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/jito.rs` and `#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/zeroslot.rs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 85 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (19–20 lines × 2) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/shred_stream.rs:298— #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/shred_stream.rs:298-316 | #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/shred_stream.rs:337-356 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/common/logger.rs:63— #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/common/logger.rs:63-76 | #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/logger.rs:63-76 — before extracting anything, compare `#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/common/logger.rs` and `#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/logger.rs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 34 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/jito.rs:83— #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/jito.rs:83-93 | #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/zeroslot.rs:82-92 — before extracting anything, compare `#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/jito.rs` and `#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/zeroslot.rs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 85 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (5–6 lines × 3) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/commands.rs:96— #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/commands.rs:96-101 | #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/commands.rs:114-119 | #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/commands.rs:131-135 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/secondbuy.rs:33— #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/secondbuy.rs:33-37 | #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/secondbuy.rs:112-116 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/hardcap.rs:76— #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/hardcap.rs:76-83 | #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/hardcap.rs:113-119 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 3) #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/jito.rs:54— #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/jito.rs:54-58 | #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/nextblock.rs:49-53 | #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/zeroslot.rs:51-55 — before extracting anything, compare `#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/jito.rs` and `#_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/services/zeroslot.rs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 85 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
No DR/backup evidence — A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.
Forked directory tree (10 identical files, ~17978 lines × 2 trees) REDACTED:1— 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/ and 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/ are near-verbatim copies of each other: 10 files are byte-identical under the same relative paths (~17978 lines; the trees hold 14 and 25 files). That is one structural fact, not 10 local ones: every edit made to one tree and not the other drifts silently, which is the failure whole-tree forks guarantee. Pick one tree as the single source and produce the other from it (generated, copied at build or release time, or re-exported) — or, if the copy is a stale snapshot nothing produces any more, delete it. Check first whether the copy is a deliberately published deliverable (a template consumers copy verbatim, a released sample frozen at a version); where it is, keep it produced from the source tree rather than edited in place.
Duplication concentrated across 3 sibling directories (5 clone groups) 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:1— 5 of the duplicated blocks reported below have copies in at least two of the sibling directories 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC, 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC, 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket under the repository root. That concentration is one structural fact, not 5 local ones: the siblings replicate behaviour none of them owns, which is the shape of a missing shared module — a common library every sibling imports — rather than 5 separate extractions. Check first whether the siblings are deliberately standalone deliverables (scaffold templates, demo apps that must stay copy-pasteable); where they are, the duplication is the design and the per-block rows are the ones to act on.
Wholesale file copy (182 identical lines × 2 files) 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:1— 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:1 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:1 — these 2 files are line-for-line copies of one another — 182 lines are identical, in the same order, in every one of them — so this is one fact about the file set, not a block to extract. An edit made to one file and not the others changes behaviour silently, which is the failure a wholesale copy guarantees. Pick one file as the single source and derive the others from it (re-export it, spread it into the local overrides each variant genuinely needs, or generate the copies at build time) — the few lines that differ between the files are exactly the part each variant should still own. Check first whether the copies are deliberately standalone deliverables (a translation file seeded from its sibling and waiting to be translated); where they are, the duplication is the design, and the honest move is to mark the seeded file as untranslated rather than to let it pass as done.
Wholesale file copy (156 identical lines × 3 files) 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:1— 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:1 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:1 · 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket/swap.js:1 — these 3 files are line-for-line copies of one another — 156 lines are identical, in the same order, in every one of them — so this is one fact about the file set, not a block to extract. An edit made to one file and not the others changes behaviour silently, which is the failure a wholesale copy guarantees. Pick one file as the single source and derive the others from it (re-export it, spread it into the local overrides each variant genuinely needs, or generate the copies at build time) — the few lines that differ between the files are exactly the part each variant should still own. Check first whether the copies are deliberately standalone deliverables (a translation file seeded from its sibling and waiting to be translated); where they are, the duplication is the design, and the honest move is to mark the seeded file as untranslated rather than to let it pass as done.
Wholesale file copy (125 identical lines × 2 files) REDACTED:1— REDACTED:1 · REDACTED:1 — these 2 files are line-for-line copies of one another — 125 lines are identical, in the same order, in every one of them — so this is one fact about the file set, not a block to extract. An edit made to one file and not the others changes behaviour silently, which is the failure a wholesale copy guarantees. Pick one file as the single source and derive the others from it (re-export it, spread it into the local overrides each variant genuinely needs, or generate the copies at build time) — the few lines that differ between the files are exactly the part each variant should still own. Check first whether the copies are deliberately standalone deliverables (a translation file seeded from its sibling and waiting to be translated); where they are, the duplication is the design, and the honest move is to mark the seeded file as untranslated rather than to let it pass as done.
Wholesale file copy (95 identical lines × 2 files) 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:1— 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:1 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:1 — these 2 files are line-for-line copies of one another — 95 lines are identical, in the same order, in every one of them — so this is one fact about the file set, not a block to extract. An edit made to one file and not the others changes behaviour silently, which is the failure a wholesale copy guarantees. Pick one file as the single source and derive the others from it (re-export it, spread it into the local overrides each variant genuinely needs, or generate the copies at build time) — the few lines that differ between the files are exactly the part each variant should still own. Check first whether the copies are deliberately standalone deliverables (a translation file seeded from its sibling and waiting to be translated); where they are, the duplication is the design, and the honest move is to mark the seeded file as untranslated rather than to let it pass as done.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2 locations) 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/index.js:97— 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/index.js:97 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/main.js:75 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2 locations) 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/server.js:69— 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/server.js:69 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/server.js:114 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2 locations) 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/server.js:88— 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/server.js:88 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/server.js:105 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2 locations) 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/server.js:123— 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/server.js:123 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/server.js:141 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 4 locations) 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/main.js:9— 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/main.js:9 · 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:20 · 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:20 · 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket/swap.js:21 — the 4 copies are spread across 4 files, and the CITED SPAN is a run of MODULE-LEVEL DECLARATIONS — bindings the module declares and exports — rather than statements with a call site. Do not read this as an extract-a-helper row: a call expression cannot stand where a declaration was, and putting one there would delete the names themselves, which are what the rest of the codebase imports. What actually repeats here is the INITIALISER — the same expression shape written once per binding. So give that expression one name (a small helper the initialisers call, or a shared base value they are each derived from) and keep every binding under the name it already has. Where the run is an enumeration — one binding per distinct thing, differing precisely in the thing each one names — the repetition IS the enumeration and collapsing it would delete entries; consider instead whether the set belongs in one exported table the individual names are read out of. Reported because the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Boundary violation [package:relative-cross-package] 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket/swap.js:13— 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket/swap.js:13 reaches into another package with a relative path (./logger.js) — import the package by name instead.
Test Coverage — 0% of 22 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph — 'production' here is the RESIDUE: every source file left once tests, tooling, generated output, config, declarations and declaration-only modules, fixture corpora, type fixtures, behaviour-free data modules, re-export barrels, registration/constant data modules and service workers are set aside, so the percentage is taken over a smaller denominator than the workspace's file count
R6 · Tooling· No test, lint or typecheck script · ×1
No test, lint or typecheck script — test ✗ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.
Unused dependency '@degenfrends/solana-rugchecker' — Declared in 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
Unused dependency '@pump-fun/pump-sdk' — Declared in 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
Unused dependency '@pump-fun/pump-swap-sdk' — Declared in 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.
Third-party script without Subresource Integrity 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/dashboard/public/index.html:9— `https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/chart.js` is executed by this page with no Subresource Integrity. Whoever can answer that request — the CDN, anyone who compromises it, anyone on the network path — runs arbitrary script in this page's origin, with its session. The URL also names no version, so it resolves to whatever that origin serves at fetch time — the executed bytes can change with nobody touching this repository.
Minor — 84 finding(s)
P2 · Observability· Console output used as the logging channel · ×40
Console output used as the logging channel 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:23— `2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 23 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Console output used as the logging channel 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:38— `2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 38 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Console output used as the logging channel 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:48— `2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 48 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Console output used as the logging channel 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:66— `2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 66 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Console output used as the logging channel 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:69— `2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 69 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Console output used as the logging channel 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:74— `2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 74 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Console output used as the logging channel 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:80— `2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 80 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Console output used as the logging channel 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:82— `2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 82 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Console output used as the logging channel 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:91— `2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 91 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Console output used as the logging channel 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:99— `2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 99 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Console output used as the logging channel 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:121— `2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 121 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Console output used as the logging channel 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:126— `2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 126 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Console output used as the logging channel 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:130— `2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 130 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Console output used as the logging channel 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:143— `2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js` reports through `console.*` at line 143 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Console output used as the logging channel REDACTED:27— `REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 27 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Console output used as the logging channel REDACTED:64— `REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 64 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Console output used as the logging channel REDACTED:78— `REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 78 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Console output used as the logging channel REDACTED:94— `REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 94 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Console output used as the logging channel REDACTED:102— `REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 102 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Console output used as the logging channel REDACTED:108— `REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 108 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Console output used as the logging channel REDACTED:142— `REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 142 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Console output used as the logging channel REDACTED:143— `REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 143 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Console output used as the logging channel REDACTED:144— `REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 144 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Console output used as the logging channel REDACTED:145— `REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 145 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Console output used as the logging channel REDACTED:149— `REDACTED` reports through `console.*` at line 149 although other files in its module log through a logger. Console lines carry no level, fields or correlation and never reach the log pipeline.
Duplicated predicate 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:23— `!current || !current.data || !largest || !largest.data` appears character-identically in 2 files — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js, 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js:30— `!largestDataInstruction || !largestDataInstruction.data` appears character-identically in 2 files — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js, 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/parsingtransaction.js. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate REDACTED:57— `!tx || !meta?.transaction?.meta?.logMessages` appears character-identically in 2 files — REDACTED, REDACTED. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:138— `SWAP_METHOD === "solana" || SWAP_METHOD === "0slot"` appears character-identically in 3 files — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js, 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js, 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket/swap.js. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:125— `err.message && err.message.includes("Invalid param")` appears character-identically in 2 files — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js, 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:113— `err.name === "TokenAccountNotFoundError" || (err.message && ( err.message.includes("Failed to find account") || err.message.includes("Accoun…` appears character-identically in 2 files — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js, 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:22— `process.env.NOZOMI_TIP_LAMPORTS || 200000` appears character-identically in 3 files — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js, 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js, 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket/swap.js. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:24— `process.env.PRIORITIZATION_FEE_LAMPORTS || 10000` appears character-identically in 3 files — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js, 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js, 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket/swap.js. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js:254— `retryCount > 1 && tokenA !== SOL_ADDRESS && tokenB === SOL_ADDRESS` appears character-identically in 3 files — 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js, 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/swap.js, 3_sniper bot(node) using using Helius websocket/swap.js. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate REDACTED:60— `typeof log === "string" && log.toLowerCase().includes("instruction: mintto")` appears character-identically in 2 files — REDACTED, REDACTED. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/dex/pump_fun.rs:163— `info!` at line 163 is handed a format string with `{…}` values in it, so tracing records one finished `message` field — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Record the values as fields beside a constant message instead: `info!(order_id = %order_id, status = ?status, "order status updated")` (`%` records a value by its `Display`, `?` by its `Debug`, a bare name as itself), which a JSON subscriber, OpenTelemetry or a log store keeps as queryable keys. An error goes in as a field too: `error = %err`.
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/dex/pump_fun.rs:208— `info!` at line 208 is handed a format string with `{…}` values in it, so tracing records one finished `message` field — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Record the values as fields beside a constant message instead: `info!(order_id = %order_id, status = ?status, "order status updated")` (`%` records a value by its `Display`, `?` by its `Debug`, a bare name as itself), which a JSON subscriber, OpenTelemetry or a log store keeps as queryable keys. An error goes in as a field too: `error = %err`.
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/dex/pump_fun.rs:273— `info!` at line 273 is handed a format string with `{…}` values in it, so tracing records one finished `message` field — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Record the values as fields beside a constant message instead: `info!(order_id = %order_id, status = ?status, "order status updated")` (`%` records a value by its `Display`, `?` by its `Debug`, a bare name as itself), which a JSON subscriber, OpenTelemetry or a log store keeps as queryable keys. An error goes in as a field too: `error = %err`.
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/dex/pump_fun.rs:304— `info!` at line 304 is handed a format string with `{…}` values in it, so tracing records one finished `message` field — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Record the values as fields beside a constant message instead: `info!(order_id = %order_id, status = ?status, "order status updated")` (`%` records a value by its `Display`, `?` by its `Debug`, a bare name as itself), which a JSON subscriber, OpenTelemetry or a log store keeps as queryable keys. An error goes in as a field too: `error = %err`.
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/dex/pump_fun.rs:320— `info!` at line 320 is handed a format string with `{…}` values in it, so tracing records one finished `message` field — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Record the values as fields beside a constant message instead: `info!(order_id = %order_id, status = ?status, "order status updated")` (`%` records a value by its `Display`, `?` by its `Debug`, a bare name as itself), which a JSON subscriber, OpenTelemetry or a log store keeps as queryable keys. An error goes in as a field too: `error = %err`.
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/core/token.rs:21— `info!` at line 21 is handed a format string with `{…}` values in it, so tracing records one finished `message` field — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Record the values as fields beside a constant message instead: `info!(order_id = %order_id, status = ?status, "order status updated")` (`%` records a value by its `Display`, `?` by its `Debug`, a bare name as itself), which a JSON subscriber, OpenTelemetry or a log store keeps as queryable keys. An error goes in as a field too: `error = %err`.
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/core/token.rs:28— `info!` at line 28 is handed a format string with `{…}` values in it, so tracing records one finished `message` field — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Record the values as fields beside a constant message instead: `info!(order_id = %order_id, status = ?status, "order status updated")` (`%` records a value by its `Display`, `?` by its `Debug`, a bare name as itself), which a JSON subscriber, OpenTelemetry or a log store keeps as queryable keys. An error goes in as a field too: `error = %err`.
Interpolated log message defeats structured logging #_sniper (Rust) using jito Shred stream/src/core/token.rs:35— `info!` at line 35 is handed a format string with `{…}` values in it, so tracing records one finished `message` field — the values in it cannot be queried, filtered or aggregated as fields, and every occurrence reads as a different message. Record the values as fields beside a constant message instead: `info!(order_id = %order_id, status = ?status, "order status updated")` (`%` records a value by its `Display`, `?` by its `Debug`, a bare name as itself), which a JSON subscriber, OpenTelemetry or a log store keeps as queryable keys. An error goes in as a field too: `error = %err`.
README/code drift README.md:153— README.md names Node.js 18, but the repository declares engines `>=16.0.0`, engines `>=16.0.0`, engines `>=16.0.0`. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
README/code drift 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/README.md:47— 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/README.md names Node.js 18, but the repository declares engines `>=16.0.0`, engines `>=16.0.0`, engines `>=16.0.0`. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
R7 · Dead Code· Unused export 'checkWalletBalance' · ×2
Unused export 'checkWalletBalance' 1_solana sniper bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:136— Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.
Unused export 'checkWalletBalance' 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/fuc.js:136— Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.
No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
No SAST — No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add cargo-audit / cargo-deny (or clippy) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 0 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback· No rollback/health safety · ×1
No rollback/health safety — Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
R7 · Dead Code· Unused export 'getModuleConfig' · ×1
Unused export 'getModuleConfig' 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/config.js:162— Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.
Unused export 'logSuccess' 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/utils/logger.js:95— Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.
R7 · Dead Code· Unused export 'logPerformance' · ×1
Unused export 'logPerformance' 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/utils/logger.js:100— Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.
R7 · Dead Code· Unused export 'logTradeExecution' · ×1
Unused export 'logTradeExecution' 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/utils/logger.js:109— Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.
Unused export 'logConfig' 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/utils/logger.js:147— Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.
R7 · Dead Code· Unused export 'logApiRequest' · ×1
Unused export 'logApiRequest' 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/utils/logger.js:152— Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.
R7 · Dead Code· Unused export 'logApiResponse' · ×1
Unused export 'logApiResponse' 2_copy trading bot(node) using gRPC/utils/logger.js:162— Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.
X2 · Cancellation propagation· Not all async functions that make a request accept an AbortSignal · ×1
Not all async functions that make a request accept an AbortSignal — Only 0/10 async functions that make a cancellable request (fetch, axios, ky, ofetch) accept an AbortSignal or pass one on, so a request keeps running after whatever wanted it has given up — a page navigated away from, an unmounted component, a timed-out job. Take a `signal` (or an options object that carries one) and hand it to the request; where nothing could ever cancel the call, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against how the function is used.
Off the main sequence: shared_state — shared_state: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — the shape a shared-kernel / building-block library has BY DESIGN — concrete and widely depended-on is what makes it useful, and this dimension does not penalise it (the distance is reported for completeness, not as a defect). Worth a look only if it has grown past one coherent kernel into an everything-bucket.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
Run 01a18291-6d05-71a1-8e1b-8fd6af3c754d · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 39 · Warnings: 132 · Recommendations: 84 · Info: 1 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 28-10-2026 @ 12:52 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.