Executive summary
oblador/react-native-keychain is rated At risk because critical security findings are open, most of them in the packages it uses. Its score is held back because we found no logging, tracing or health checks in the code and no automated security scanning of the code, its secrets or its dependencies. It scores 54 out of 100, which the At risk rating leaves unchanged.
Production Readiness, at 42, is the weakest lens and counts most in the score. The best first steps are adopting a logging library and adding automated security scanning, each worth about 7 points. Raising Production Readiness to 70 would lift the score to about 63.
Fifty-nine known security holes in the packages the code depends on can be used by attackers. Twenty-six pipeline tools are referenced by a changeable name, so the build pipeline can be tampered with, and two passwords or keys are open to anyone who can read the repository. Updating the vulnerable packages, pinning each tool to an exact version and replacing each exposed password or key would close these risks. Fixing the weaknesses the scanner points to would fix the security weakness in the code.
The product code is 3,754 lines, about €3,900 to rebuild.
If Production Readiness rose from 42 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 54 to about 63.
New since the last survey: 10 findings
- Secrets (history) · REDACTED
- Secrets (history) · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
- Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED
- Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED
- Async & latency hygiene · Sync-over-async blocking KeychainExample/e2e/utils/authHelpers.ts
- Async & latency hygiene · Sync-over-async blocking KeychainExample/e2e/utils/authHelpers.ts
- Async & latency hygiene · Sync-over-async blocking KeychainExample/e2e/utils/authHelpers.ts
Fixed since the last survey: 8 findings
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
- Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] REDACTED
- Supply-chain Provenance & Signing REDACTED
- Async & latency hygiene · Sync-over-async blocking KeychainExample/e2e/utils/authHelpers.ts
- Async & latency hygiene · Sync-over-async blocking KeychainExample/e2e/utils/authHelpers.ts
Rebuild cost: about €3,900 · Estimate
| Cost to rebuild | €1,300 to €6,400, for 21 to 68 hours of work, under 0.1 person-years for one engineer |
|---|---|
| Difficulty of the problem | Standard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write. |
| Quality factor | ×0.8 at a score of 54. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it. |
| Size | Small: 3,754 lines of product code |
| What it is not | Not a quotation: nobody has offered to build it for that. Not a valuation: it says nothing about what the business is worth. Not a certified figure: no professional has signed it as one. |
Top priorities
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
| uses → | 1 (global) | 2 KeychainExample.src | 3 com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule.AccessControl | 4 com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule.AuthPromptOptions | 5 com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule.Errors | 6 com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule.KnownCiphers | 7 com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule.Maps | 8 com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBase | 9 com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreRsaEcb | 10 com.oblador.keychain.exceptions | 11 src | 12 src.NativeKeychainManager | 13 src.enums | 14 website.src | 15 com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreAesCbc | 16 com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreAesGcm | 17 com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler | 18 com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage | 19 com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.CryptoOperation | 20 com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage | 21 com.oblador.keychain.PrefsStorageBase | 22 com.oblador.keychain | 23 com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule | 24 com.oblador.keychain.SecurityLevel |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 (global) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 2 KeychainExample.src | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 3 com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule.AccessControl | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 4 com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule.AuthPromptOptions | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 5 com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule.Errors | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 6 com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule.KnownCiphers | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 7 com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule.Maps | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 8 com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBase | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 9 com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreRsaEcb | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 10 com.oblador.keychain.exceptions | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 11 src | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 12 src.NativeKeychainManager | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 13 src.enums | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 14 website.src | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 15 com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreAesCbc | 2 | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| 16 com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreAesGcm | 2 | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| 17 com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler | 1 | 4 | 8 | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 18 com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage | 3 | 4 | 1 | 5 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| 19 com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.CryptoOperation | 2 | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| 20 com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||
| 21 com.oblador.keychain.PrefsStorageBase | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| 22 com.oblador.keychain | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| 23 com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||
| 24 com.oblador.keychain.SecurityLevel | 3 |
15→8 com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreAesCbc uses com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBase✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreAesCbc uses a type in com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBase.
- The types involved
com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreAesCbc.IV→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBase.DecryptBytesHandlercom.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreAesCbc.IV→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBase.EncryptStringHandler
- Direction
- com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreAesCbc uses com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBase, so a change to com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBase can break com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreAesCbc, while a change to com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreAesCbc can't break com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBase.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreAesCbc uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
16→8 com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreAesGcm uses com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBase✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreAesGcm uses a type in com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBase.
- The types involved
com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreAesGcm.IV→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBase.DecryptBytesHandlercom.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreAesGcm.IV→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBase.EncryptStringHandler
- Direction
- com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreAesGcm uses com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBase, so a change to com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBase can break com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreAesGcm, while a change to com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreAesGcm can't break com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBase.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreAesGcm uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
17→10 com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler uses com.oblador.keychain.exceptions✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler uses a type in com.oblador.keychain.exceptions.
- The types involved
com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.ResultHandlerInteractiveBiometric→com.oblador.keychain.exceptions.KeychainException
- Direction
- com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler uses com.oblador.keychain.exceptions, so a change to com.oblador.keychain.exceptions can break com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler, while a change to com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler can't break com.oblador.keychain.exceptions.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
17→18 com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler uses com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage part of a loop✕
- Connections
- 4 pairs of types, where a type in com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler uses a type in com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.
- The types involved
com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.ResultHandlerInteractiveBiometric→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStoragecom.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.ResultHandlerInteractiveBiometric→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBasecom.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.ResultHandlerInteractiveBiometricManualRetry→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStoragecom.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.ResultHandlerProvider→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage
- Direction
- com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler uses com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage, so a change to com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage can break com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler, while a change to com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler can't break com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.
- Position
- Above the diagonal, so it is part of a loop. Neither module can be changed, tested or released on its own until one of these dependencies is removed.
17→20 com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler uses com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage part of a loop✕
- Connections
- 8 pairs of types, where a type in com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler uses a type in com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage.
- The types involved
com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.ResultHandler→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage.DecryptionResultcom.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.ResultHandler→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage.EncryptionResultcom.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.ResultHandlerInteractiveBiometric→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage.DecryptionResultcom.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.ResultHandlerInteractiveBiometric→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage.EncryptionResultcom.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.ResultHandlerInteractiveBiometricManualRetry→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage.DecryptionResultcom.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.ResultHandlerInteractiveBiometricManualRetry→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage.EncryptionResultcom.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.ResultHandlerNonInteractive→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage.DecryptionResultcom.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.ResultHandlerNonInteractive→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage.EncryptionResult
- Direction
- com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler uses com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage, so a change to com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage can break com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler, while a change to com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler can't break com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage.
- Position
- Above the diagonal, so it is part of a loop. Neither module can be changed, tested or released on its own until one of these dependencies is removed.
18→8 com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage uses com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBase✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage uses a type in com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBase.
- The types involved
com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBase→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBase.DecryptBytesHandlercom.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBase→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBase.EncryptStringHandlercom.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreAesCbc→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBase.DecryptBytesHandler
- Direction
- com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage uses com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBase, so a change to com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBase can break com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage, while a change to com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage can't break com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBase.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
18→17 com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage uses com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler✕
- Connections
- 4 pairs of types, where a type in com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage uses a type in com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.
- The types involved
com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage→com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.ResultHandlercom.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreAesCbc→com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.ResultHandlercom.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreAesGcm→com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.ResultHandlercom.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreRsaEcb→com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.ResultHandler
- Direction
- com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage uses com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler, so a change to com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler can break com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage, while a change to com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage can't break com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
18→20 com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage uses com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage part of a loop✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage uses a type in com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage.
- The types involved
com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreRsaEcb→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage.EncryptionResult
- Direction
- com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage uses com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage, so a change to com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage can break com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage, while a change to com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage can't break com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage.
- Position
- Above the diagonal, so it is part of a loop. Neither module can be changed, tested or released on its own until one of these dependencies is removed.
18→22 com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage uses com.oblador.keychain part of a loop✕
- Connections
- 5 pairs of types, where a type in com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage uses a type in com.oblador.keychain.
- The types involved
com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage→com.oblador.keychain.SecurityLevelcom.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageBase→com.oblador.keychain.SecurityLevelcom.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreAesCbc→com.oblador.keychain.SecurityLevelcom.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreAesGcm→com.oblador.keychain.SecurityLevelcom.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorageKeystoreRsaEcb→com.oblador.keychain.SecurityLevel
- Direction
- com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage uses com.oblador.keychain, so a change to com.oblador.keychain can break com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage, while a change to com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage can't break com.oblador.keychain.
- Position
- Above the diagonal, so it is part of a loop. Neither module can be changed, tested or released on its own until one of these dependencies is removed.
19→17 com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.CryptoOperation uses com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler✕
- Connections
- 2 pairs of types, where a type in com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.CryptoOperation uses a type in com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.
- The types involved
com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.CryptoOperation.DECRYPT→com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.CryptoOperationcom.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.CryptoOperation.ENCRYPT→com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.CryptoOperation
- Direction
- com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.CryptoOperation uses com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler, so a change to com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler can break com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.CryptoOperation, while a change to com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.CryptoOperation can't break com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.CryptoOperation uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
20→18 com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage uses com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage uses a type in com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.
- The types involved
com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage.EncryptionResult→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage
- Direction
- com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage uses com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage, so a change to com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage can break com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage, while a change to com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage can't break com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
20→22 com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage uses com.oblador.keychain part of a loop✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage uses a type in com.oblador.keychain.
- The types involved
com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage.DecryptionResult→com.oblador.keychain.SecurityLevel
- Direction
- com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage uses com.oblador.keychain, so a change to com.oblador.keychain can break com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage, while a change to com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage can't break com.oblador.keychain.
- Position
- Above the diagonal, so it is part of a loop. Neither module can be changed, tested or released on its own until one of these dependencies is removed.
21→20 com.oblador.keychain.PrefsStorageBase uses com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.oblador.keychain.PrefsStorageBase uses a type in com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage.
- The types involved
com.oblador.keychain.PrefsStorageBase.ResultSet→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage.CipherResult
- Direction
- com.oblador.keychain.PrefsStorageBase uses com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage, so a change to com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage can break com.oblador.keychain.PrefsStorageBase, while a change to com.oblador.keychain.PrefsStorageBase can't break com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.oblador.keychain.PrefsStorageBase uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
22→17 com.oblador.keychain uses com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.oblador.keychain uses a type in com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.
- The types involved
com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule→com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.ResultHandler
- Direction
- com.oblador.keychain uses com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler, so a change to com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler can break com.oblador.keychain, while a change to com.oblador.keychain can't break com.oblador.keychain.resultHandler.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.oblador.keychain uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
22→18 com.oblador.keychain uses com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.oblador.keychain uses a type in com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.
- The types involved
com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage
- Direction
- com.oblador.keychain uses com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage, so a change to com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage can break com.oblador.keychain, while a change to com.oblador.keychain can't break com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.oblador.keychain uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
22→20 com.oblador.keychain uses com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage✕
- Connections
- 4 pairs of types, where a type in com.oblador.keychain uses a type in com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage.
- The types involved
com.oblador.keychain.DataStorePrefsStorage→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage.EncryptionResultcom.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage.DecryptionResultcom.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage.EncryptionResultcom.oblador.keychain.PrefsStorageBase→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage.EncryptionResult
- Direction
- com.oblador.keychain uses com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage, so a change to com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage can break com.oblador.keychain, while a change to com.oblador.keychain can't break com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.oblador.keychain uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
22→21 com.oblador.keychain uses com.oblador.keychain.PrefsStorageBase✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in com.oblador.keychain uses a type in com.oblador.keychain.PrefsStorageBase.
- The types involved
com.oblador.keychain.DataStorePrefsStorage→com.oblador.keychain.PrefsStorageBase.ResultSetcom.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule→com.oblador.keychain.PrefsStorageBase.ResultSetcom.oblador.keychain.PrefsStorageBase→com.oblador.keychain.PrefsStorageBase.ResultSet
- Direction
- com.oblador.keychain uses com.oblador.keychain.PrefsStorageBase, so a change to com.oblador.keychain.PrefsStorageBase can break com.oblador.keychain, while a change to com.oblador.keychain can't break com.oblador.keychain.PrefsStorageBase.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.oblador.keychain uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
23→18 com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule uses com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule uses a type in com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.
- The types involved
com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule.Companion→com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.CipherStorage
- Direction
- com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule uses com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage, so a change to com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage can break com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule, while a change to com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule can't break com.oblador.keychain.cipherStorage.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
23→22 com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule uses com.oblador.keychain✕
- Connections
- 1 pair of types, where a type in com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule uses a type in com.oblador.keychain.
- The types involved
com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule.Companion→com.oblador.keychain.SecurityLevel
- Direction
- com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule uses com.oblador.keychain, so a change to com.oblador.keychain can break com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule, while a change to com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule can't break com.oblador.keychain.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.oblador.keychain.KeychainModule uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
24→22 com.oblador.keychain.SecurityLevel uses com.oblador.keychain✕
- Connections
- 3 pairs of types, where a type in com.oblador.keychain.SecurityLevel uses a type in com.oblador.keychain.
- The types involved
com.oblador.keychain.SecurityLevel.ANY→com.oblador.keychain.SecurityLevelcom.oblador.keychain.SecurityLevel.SECURE_HARDWARE→com.oblador.keychain.SecurityLevelcom.oblador.keychain.SecurityLevel.SECURE_SOFTWARE→com.oblador.keychain.SecurityLevel
- Direction
- com.oblador.keychain.SecurityLevel uses com.oblador.keychain, so a change to com.oblador.keychain can break com.oblador.keychain.SecurityLevel, while a change to com.oblador.keychain.SecurityLevel can't break com.oblador.keychain.
- Position
- Below the diagonal: com.oblador.keychain.SecurityLevel uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Performance
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures | 100 | High / Critical |
| A05:2025 — Injection | 28 | High / Critical |
| A07:2025 — Authentication Failures | 3 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, establish observability by adopting structured logging and implementing security checks in CI to prevent regressions. Next, improve latency by replacing synchronous calls with async alternatives and maintain release hygiene through a consistent changelog. Finally, protect API stability by restricting public exposure of internal implementation types.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adopt SLF4J (with a Logback or Log4j2 JSON encoder) and log at meaningful points in the modules you run. | +7.2 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +7.2 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| TypeScript/JavaScript: use the promise APIs (fs/promises, a promisified child_process.execFile, the async zlib/crypto functions) and await them instead of the *Sync variants. | +2.7 pts | Medium | Async & latency hygiene |
| Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release. | +2.7 pts | Medium | Release Hygiene |
| Keep implementation types off the public surface (Java: package-private (no modifier), or leave its package out of `module-info` exports; Kotlin: `internal`) so internals can change without breaking consumers. | +2.0 pts | Medium | Library API & versioning |
| Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them. | +2.0 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Resolve the 51 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (49), REDACTED (2). | +0.8 pts | Medium | Dependency Vulnerabilities |
| Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. | +0.4 pts | Low | Supply-chain Provenance & Signing |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 0.0 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 2.3 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 2.7 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 2.7 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 4.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.8 | Mixed | Secrets (history): High secret: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| KeychainExample/src/App.tsx | 7.4 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: App.App (cyclomatic 16) |
| android/src/main/java/com/oblador/keychain/KeychainModule.kt | 7.8 | Mixed | God Classes: ClassTooLong: KeychainModule |
| REDACTED | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED |
| android/src/main/java/com/oblador/keychain/cipherStorage/CipherStorageKeystoreAesGcm.kt | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (25–30 lines × 2) |
| android/src/main/java/com/oblador/keychain/cipherStorage/CipherStorageKeystoreAesCbc.kt | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 67 of 67 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); none rely on LLM judgement. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 67 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 136 of 152 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Watchdog duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | — | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D4 Code Duplication — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The 2 duplicated block group(s) on this row were found in the languages this pass could tokenize, and they do NOT cover all of this repository's production source: .mm (714 lines, 16% of production source) went unread, because no language model this pass could load exposed a clone-unit token stream for those file kinds. Duplication in that source is UNMEASURED — its absence from the count above is a gap in this analyzer's language coverage, not a finding that the code is free of duplication. Duplication in .ts is measured by R10 Code Duplication and is not part of this gap.
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: the JavaScript/TypeScript half could not be measured — the jest suite in KeychainExample/ ran and not one test passed (● Multiple configurations found:), so the coverage would describe the failed run, not the code — but the repository pins Node 24.15.0 in .node-version and the analyzer image ran it on Node 22, so the failure describes our runtime, not the suite. Coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo. In the meantime, commit (or publish into the working tree) the lcov/Cobertura report your CI produces and the real number is read on the next scan. You can widen what we reach: optional: commit the lcov/Cobertura report your CI produces, and the real number is read on the next scan.
- D9 Test Distribution — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test distribution NOT SCORED: this repository's production source spans more than one ecosystem, and the test-pyramid census cannot read the .kt test suite(s) — so the pyramid was not measured for the repository as a whole. The suites we could count came back with 15 test method(s) (0 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 15 e2e), but that is a shape for one part of the product and we do not publish a partial pyramid as if it were complete. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — test distribution is excluded from the score rather than counted.
- D10 Test Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The 15 test(s) behind this row are the ones the JavaScript/TypeScript census could read, and this repository also carries at least 2 test source file(s) (.kt, .java) that it cannot: it reads JavaScript/TypeScript test declarations off disk, so a JUnit/pytest-style suite is invisible to it. Skipped tests, zero-assertion tests and the other quality signals on this row are UNMEASURED in that suite — their absence from the counts above is a gap in this analyzer's language coverage, not a finding that those tests are sound.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test reliability NOT MEASURED: the JavaScript/TypeScript suite could not be re-run in the analyzer sandbox — the jest run in KeychainExample/ produced no per-test report (● Multiple configurations found:). This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — it is excluded from the score.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test reliability for the jest suite in KeychainExample/ was NOT MEASURED: the jest run in KeychainExample/ produced no per-test report (● Multiple configurations found:). This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repository, and the suite is excluded from the measurement rather than counted against it.
- D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares package.json, but the licence verdict published here was taken over its gem dependencies. Nothing was read about its npm dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
- D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares a Gradle build (build.gradle/build.gradle.kts), but the licence verdict published here was taken over its gem dependencies. Nothing was read about its Gradle dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
- D19 Documentation Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Each ecosystem's manifests (what makes a folder runnable or a published package) need their own proof before D19 judges its units. Until then those folders' READMEs are judged only as documents (boilerplate, structure), never counted as complete.
- D21 Naming Consistency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D21's deterministic naming rules are gated on C# first (docs/plans/deterministic-engine.md, P5): each other language is switched on only after its own concept suite and A/B gate pass. Until then its declarations carry no naming verdict this run — this says nothing about whether its names are consistent.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is a COLLECTOR gap, not an environment fault: it declares a published package (package.json), but no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here, so this ecosystem's public API has no collector, and the remedy is to write one — no change to the scan image can close it.
- D24 Comment Value — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover the language this repository's product is written in, so it had nothing of the product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- D26 Project Cohesion — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Project size and spread are measured over build units whose source a code model reads. This repository's .mm source is a material share of its production lines and was read by none, so the score is a verdict about the units that were read. Not a finding that the unread source is cohesive — it is unmeasured.
- D27 Navigability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Navigability is taken over call sites whose callee resolved. For C# that population includes calls into referenced assemblies; for this language only calls declared inside the repository count, so the abstention threshold reads the repository's use of its standard library as a resolution failure. That is a limit of this analyzer, not a build problem in this repository.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `android/src/main/java/com/oblador/keychain/cipherStorage/CipherStorageBase.kt`, `website/docusaurus.config.ts` produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via DevServer (start). the dev server did not expose a crawlable HTTP endpoint in time — no runtime evidence.
- C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
- C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
- C3 Audit Trail — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These audit controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks audit controls.
- C4 Data Retention — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These retention controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks retention controls.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These data-subject rights controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks data-subject rights controls.
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and this repository's Kotlin, c, objectivec is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and this repository's Kotlin, c, objectivec is most of its product and is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- M3 Folder & project structure — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. Whether the tests sit apart from production code is not visible here, because the suite is not in a form this pass reads. The test-separation credit is granted rather than withheld: this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about the repository's tests. You can widen what we reach: keep the test surface somewhere a reader can find it without opening a binary — an exported/checked-in test source tree beside the production code makes the suite reviewable, diffable and discoverable by tooling.
- P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and none applies: this repository publishes a library and deploys nothing (no container, IaC or deployment manifest), so it holds no runtime state of its own. Any data-access dependency it declares is the store it is a CLIENT for, not one it operates. The DR control belongs to whoever runs that data.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These web-security controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks web-security controls.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality publishes two things only: a runnable or packaged unit with no example, and a multi-project root README that maps none of its parts. It does not judge clarity, and its other checks (overview, licence, boilerplate, structure, empty sections, XML-doc coverage) are withheld after adjudication: their candidates are counted in the card's gaps, not shown as rows. A false statement in a document is M4's; units are .NET projects only.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
1 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was App.App at 16.
What to do
- Bring the 1 body over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with App.App (cyclomatic 16). — Refactoring it lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 9.9 to about 10.0/10.
- Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
1 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was App.App at 18.
What to do
- Bring the 1 body over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with App.App (cognitive 18). — Refactoring it lifts Cognitive Complexity from 9.7 to about 10.0/10.
- Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D3 · God Classes
3 god class(es) detected.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 FunctionTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with App.tsx. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 ClassTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with KeychainModule.kt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with KeychainModule.kt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D4 · Code Duplication
2 duplicated block group(s) detected. Measured on part of this repository only: .mm (16% of production source) was not exposed to the token comparison, so duplication there is unmeasured and is not in this count. Measured on part of this repository only: .ts (20% of production source) was not exposed to THIS dimension's token comparison and is not in this count; duplication there is measured by R10 Code Duplication, the frontend lens's card running the same clone algorithm over the JS/TS token stream.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (25–30 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with CipherStorageKeystoreAesGcm.kt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with CipherStorageKeystoreAesCbc.kt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
D5 · Coupling
4 production modules (Gradle+npm), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations; edges a convention plugin adds from buildSrc or build-logic are not visible there; 0 module(s) off the main sequence, with abstractness counted on 3 of the 4 (the rest declare no modelled class or interface, export only macros, declare types in source no model reads, or have no source directory of their own).
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 5 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D10 · Test Quality
0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 15 tests. Measured on the JavaScript/TypeScript suite only — at least 2 test source file(s) (.kt, .java) went unread, so its test quality is unmeasured and is not in these counts.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
2 outdated direct gem(s), 0 pinning defect(s). 2 declaration(s) graded against rubygems.org, 2 of them against a version resolved in a committed REDACTED. Whether any of these gems is DEPRECATED or YANKED is not graded — rubygems.org publishes no deprecation marker, and a yank removes a version rather than flagging it. Whether any is UNMAINTAINED is not graded either: no registry publishes a maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Whether any is UNUSED is a source question, not a registry one. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from the manifest there.
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 43 shipped gem(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from rubygems.org over the 43 gem(s) a consumer installs — this repository's runtime declarations closed transitively over its committed REDACTED. Development-group and `add_development_dependency` gems are excluded: they are not distributed with this repository. 2 of them publish no licence on rubygems.org; that is missing data, not a violation, and none of them is charged. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's gem dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares package.json and a Gradle build (build.gradle/build.gradle.kts), and the licences of those dependency graphs were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D16 · Bus Factor
No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author. Counted over 14 of the 30 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
D17 · Explicit Debt
0 deducted task-comment markers across 3754 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
D19 · Documentation Quality
1 of 1 documentation facets pass in full. 7 document(s) read across 1 unit(s).
D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 4 build units (Gradle, npm) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent. This repository's .mm source was read by no build unit, so this covers part of the tree, not all of it.
D28 · Secrets (history)
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 High secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
28 finding(s): 0 critical, 27 high, 1 medium, 0 low. 26 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 4 file(s) — `KeychainExample/android/gradlew` (line 72, line 178), `android/gradlew` (line 72, line 178), `android/src/main/java/com/oblador/keychain/cipherStorage/CipherStorageBase.kt` (line 473, line 479, line 485), `website/docusaurus.config.ts` (line 59, line 106) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 26 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (26 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
92 finding(s): 7 critical, 52 high, 28 medium, 5 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 51 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (49), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (51 issue-level).
- Resolve the 7 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (7). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
2 of 14 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is KeychainExample/src/App.tsx. Counted over 14 of the 30 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with App.tsx, DataStorePrefsStorage.kt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
What to do
- Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 11 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX10 · Code composition
What to do
- The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
AX6 · Interface segregation
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
- Add a README to the 4 of 4 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
M3 · Folder & project structure
P1 · CI/CD gates
P10 · Library API & versioning
- 50/54 types (93%) declared in the published library are public. For a library, every public type is a stability contract — keep implementation types off the surface and expose only the intended API.
What to do
- Keep implementation types off the public surface (Java: package-private (no modifier), or leave its package out of `module-info` exports; Kotlin: `internal`) so internals can change without breaking consumers.
P2 · Observability
- No logging call was found in the 32 JavaScript/TypeScript, JVM production file(s) this check read across 4 module(s). Each was searched for its ecosystem's logging libraries (JVM: SLF4J, Log4j2, java.util.logging, Logback, kotlin-logging, scala-logging; JavaScript/TypeScript: pino, winston, bunyan, log4js, loglevel, consola, the NestJS Logger) and for a call on a receiver named `log`/`logger` (or ending in `Logger`/`_logger`) with a level verb. It cannot see logging through a repo-local wrapper named otherwise, or in source it did not read — this is 'no logging found by this walk', not a verdict that nothing here logs. If it is right, production issues will be hard to diagnose.
What to do
- Adopt SLF4J (with a Logback or Log4j2 JSON encoder) and log at meaningful points in the modules you run.
- Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics (opentelemetry-java or Micrometer) and a health-check endpoint (Spring Boot Actuator's /actuator/health, or a /health route) for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add spotbugs with find-sec-bugs (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 8921 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
P6 · Release Hygiene
- No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
- Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene
- `cp.spawnSync` in `enterBiometrics` blocks the event loop until it finishes — a blocking call inside async code stalls the event loop — every other request waits for as long as it runs. — KeychainExample/e2e/utils/authHelpers.ts:12
- `cp.spawnSync` in `enterPasscode` blocks the event loop until it finishes — a blocking call inside async code stalls the event loop — every other request waits for as long as it runs. (×2) — KeychainExample/e2e/utils/authHelpers.ts:21, KeychainExample/e2e/utils/authHelpers.ts:23
What to do
- TypeScript/JavaScript: use the promise APIs (fs/promises, a promisified child_process.execFile, the async zlib/crypto functions) and await them instead of the *Sync variants.
R1 · Type Safety
What to do
- Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
R10 · Code Duplication
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
R3 · Large Files
R6 · Tooling
R7 · Dead Code
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
R9 · Circular Imports
X1 · Async correctness
X12 · Unreachable branch
X13 · Undrained process stream
X14 · Bypassable address classification
X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader
X16 · Unfloored truncation loop
X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document
X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness
X19 · Unrestored process-global state
X20 · Mistyped argument guard
X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard
X22 · Contradicted release guard
X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation
X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped
X25 · Inert configuration knob
X26 · Unsynchronised callback handoff
X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated
X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard
X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element
X3 · Exception handling
X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects
X5 · Nullable reference types
- ~7.7 `!!` not-null assertions per 1k Kotlin product lines — 23 across the 2998 line(s) of the 20 Kotlin file(s) read (generated, test and sample code not counted). Densest: android/src/main/java/com/oblador/keychain/KeychainModule.kt (10), android/src/main/java/com/oblador/keychain/resultHandler/ResultHandlerInteractiveBiometric.kt (8), android/src/main/java/com/oblador/keychain/cipherStorage/CipherStorageBase.kt (2). Each one tells the compiler to trust the author about null and becomes a `NullPointerException` the first time the author is wrong.
What to do
- Replace `!!` rather than adding to it: each is a run-time null check the compiler could not prove. Narrow the value with a null check, an early return or `?: return`, use `?.` / `?:` where absence is legitimate, `requireNotNull(x) { "why" }` / `checkNotNull` where a missing value is a contract breach worth a message, make the property non-nullable and set it in the constructor (or `by lazy`) instead of `lateinit` plus `!!`, or change the API so the null cannot arrive.
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 89% | Strong | Solid. |
| Architecture | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 61% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 42% | Weak — gated by P2, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 60% | Adequate — gated by D30, D36 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Performance | 60% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
Not evidenced — 4 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 61 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — Frontend below the scale floor (0 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC2 Forms & labels — Frontend below the scale floor (0 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC3 Page structure — Frontend below the scale floor (0 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — Frontend below the scale floor (0 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — Frontend below the scale floor (0 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — Frontend below the scale floor (0 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — Frontend below the scale floor (0 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's JavaScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's; this repository's Kotlin imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's; this repository's TypeScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — No container singleton was found, so there is no shared instance for concurrent requests to race on. No class in this Java code is a Spring, JSR-330 or CDI singleton bean. No class in this Kotlin code is a Spring, JSR-330 or CDI singleton bean. TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — the dev server did not expose a crawlable HTTP endpoint in time — no runtime evidence This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not measured — JavaScript/TypeScript suite did not run
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D21 Naming Consistency — Naming consistency is measured on C# only; Java, JavaScript, Kotlin, TypeScript not measured.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ projects each declaring an entity of their own. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — D24 reads C# and Visual Basic comments only — this repository's production source is .kt, .ts, .tsx, which was left unread. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D27 Navigability — D27 counts a call into the standard library or a dependency as unresolved for this repository's language (.kt), so too few call sites counted as resolved to assess navigability. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — 2 file(s) were not parsed by semgrep — the PII/GDPR ruleset never ran over them
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — JavaScript/TypeScript suite
- D9 Test Distribution — Test distribution not scored — polyglot repository, one half's tests are uncountable
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (3 value object(s))
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala, and none was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- M4 Documentation accuracy — Not applicable: the 7 current-state document(s) make no claim of a kind M4 checks. 4 claim(s) of kinds M4 does not check were not checked (install 4); M4 checks only links and versions.
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the JVM, JavaScript/TypeScript source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (JaCoCo XML — `mvn jacoco:report` or the Gradle `jacocoTestReport` task) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for `@Benchmark` in a Java, Kotlin or Scala file importing JMH or kotlinx-benchmark, Jetpack Benchmark's `measureRepeated` in a file importing androidx.benchmark, or JMH/kotlinx-benchmark/androidx.benchmark in a pom.xml, Gradle or sbt build, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not applicable: allocation awareness is rated where code engineers for it — at least 400 production lines that ship benchmarks or already use allocation-aware idioms (8 or more). This repository's Kotlin code has 2,978 production line(s), 0 such use(s) and no benchmarks, so there is no allocation work to rate. The card is reward-only: its absence costs nothing.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- R4 Test Coverage — 8 test file(s) reach none of 5 production file(s) via imports — exercised outside the JS import graph (integration/bundled), not import-reachable
- R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a yarn lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D30 (Dependency Vulnerabilities), which answers every ecosystem
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Kotlin was read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller (Ktor, OkHttp's newCall or a URL stream, from a suspend function) — a Kotlin request outside a suspend function has no caller's cancellation to honour
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — This check asks whether log calls keep a message's values apart from its text, which needs a logger that can carry them as fields. This repository's Kotlin was read, and it logs through none that an assembled message defeats: Android's `Log` and Timber, java.util.logging and log4j-api-kotlin take one finished message (as log4net does in C#), or it makes no call through a named logger at all. Calls made through SLF4J, log4j 2 or kotlin-logging (`LoggerFactory.getLogger`, `KotlinLogging.logger {}`) would be judged.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 88 finding(s)
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Serious — 43 finding(s)
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- Sync-over-async blocking KeychainExample/e2e/utils/authHelpers.ts:12
- Sync-over-async blocking KeychainExample/e2e/utils/authHelpers.ts:21
- Sync-over-async blocking KeychainExample/e2e/utils/authHelpers.ts:23
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- App.App (cyclomatic 16) KeychainExample/src/App.tsx:52
- App.App (cognitive 18) KeychainExample/src/App.tsx:52
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- FunctionTooLong: App.App KeychainExample/src/App.tsx:52
- ClassTooLong: KeychainModule android/src/main/java/com/oblador/keychain/KeychainModule.kt:39
- FileTooLong: keychain/KeychainModule.kt android/src/main/java/com/oblador/keychain/KeychainModule.kt
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- Duplicated block (25–30 lines × 2) android/src/main/java/com/oblador/keychain/cipherStorage/CipherStorageKeystoreAesGcm.kt:123
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) android/src/main/java/com/oblador/keychain/cipherStorage/CipherStorageKeystoreAesCbc.kt:155
- No structured logging
Minor — 19 finding(s)
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- Orphaned file KeychainExample/src/App.tsx:1
- Orphaned file android/src/main/java/com/oblador/keychain/DataStorePrefsStorage.kt:1
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- No ADRs
- Large public API surface
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- Not-null assertions (`!!`) reduce the null safety score
Minor — 2 finding(s)
- Outdated: activesupport
- Outdated: cocoapods
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-d16d0ee9f32d41c1b86c8af1a82395de/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-d16d0ee9f32d41c1b86c8af1a82395de/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off --exclude *.arrow --exclude *.avro --exclude *.csv --exclude *.dat --exclude *.db --exclude *.feather --exclude *.geojson --exclude *.h5 --exclude *.hdf5 --exclude *.jsonl --exclude *.log --exclude *.ndjson --exclude *.npy --exclude *.npz --exclude *.orc --exclude *.parquet --exclude *.pickle --exclude *.pkl --exclude *.psv --exclude *.sqlite --exclude *.sqlite3 --exclude *.tfrecord --exclude *.tsv --exclude *.txt . | 28 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 92 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. semgrep could not parse 2 file(s) — `android/src/main/java/com/oblador/keychain/cipherStorage/CipherStorageBase.kt`, `website/docusaurus.config.ts` — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover the unparsed regions of them; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |